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ABSTRACT
Prescription drug prices continue to rise unabated in the
United States, largely due to a system that allows brand-name
drug makers to charge whatever the market will bear. Some of
the costliest pharmaceuticals in the United States—both by price
and by total expenditure—are drugs that require a drug delivery
device for proper use. Examples include respiratory inhalers,
immunologic drugs, opioid overdose reversal drugs, patches for
chronic pain, emergent anaphylaxis treatments, and insulin
products. One of the ways manufacturers have successfully
extended market exclusivity on such combination products is by
pursuing tertiary patents on the device component of the product.
Once all patents have expired on a drug-device combination,
generic entry has been further complicated by the FDA’s strict
standards for approving “complex generic” products via the
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) pathway. These
additional requirements have proven particularly onerous for
some generic firms, and given such obstacles to complex generic
approval via the ANDA pathway, many companies have turned
to an arguably more straightforward path to compete with drug© 2022 Michael S. Sinha
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device combinations that have expired patents: the 505(b)(2) new
drug approval (NDA) pathway.
This manuscript takes the following format: (1) a detailed
explanation of the various challenges to generic competition in
combination products; (2) a description of the FDA’s complex
generic ANDA approval process and experience to date; (3) three
empirical case studies that provide real-world perspective to
these market inefficiencies; and (4) proposed solutions for
Congress, the FDA, and other key stakeholders as they attempt
to address the high cost of pharmaceutical-device combinations
in the United States.
I.
II.

Introduction ........................................................... 295
Drug Pricing in the United States ........................ 300
A. Drugs Are Priced at Whatever the Market Will
Bear ................................................................. 300
B. Patients Struggle To Afford Medications....... 302
III. Combination Products ........................................... 303
A. Listing of Patents in the FDA’s Orange Book 305
B. Product Lifecycle Management ...................... 307
C. Postmarket Research and Development ........ 307
D. Evergreening: Secondary & Tertiary Patents 308
E. Cost of Drug-Device Combination Products .. 311
F. Competition and Drug-Device Combinations 312
IV. Generics for Combination Products ...................... 313
A. Interchangeability and Automatic
Substitution .................................................... 315
V. The 505(b)(2) Pathway ................................................ 316
A. Effect on Competition and Price .................... 316
VI. The FDA and Complex Generics: 3 Case Studies..... 318
A. Case Study 1: Fluticasone/Salmeterol [Advair
Diskus] ............................................................ 319
B. Case Study 2: Adalimumab [Humira] ............ 331
C. Case Study 3: Naloxone [Narcan and Evzio] . 345
VII. Policy Recommendations ......................................... 353
A. Strengthen Initial FDA Review ..................... 353
B. Patent Reforms To Facilitate Market Entry of
Competitors ..................................................... 354
C. Complex Generic ANDA or 505(b)(2)? Why Not
a New Approach? ............................................ 355
D. Curbing Incentives for Tertiary Patenting .... 358
E. Fixing Biosimilars & Biologic Drug-Devices . 359
VIII. Conclusion ............................................................... 360

2022]

GENERIC DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATIONS

I.

295

INTRODUCTION

Rising prices in the pharmaceutical sector have captured
the attention of patients and policymakers alike over the last
several years, particularly as lifesaving medications like
epinephrine (EpiPen) and insulin (Lantus, Novolog) increase in
price and costs shift to consumers. So, too, have the prices of
expensive biologics like adalimumab (Humira) and etanercept
(Enbrel),
as
well
as
respiratory
inhalers
like
budesonide/formoterol (Symbicort) and fluticasone/salmeterol
(Advair).
What do these products have in common? They are all
designed for self-administration by patients, and all have
associated devices (these will be defined for the purpose of this
article as “drug-device combinations” or “combination
products”).1 Combination products arguably improve patient
usability and safety—an autoinjector “pen” is more user-friendly
than a vial and a syringe. Combination products also tend to be
less error-prone, allowing certain types of medications at
specified doses to be administered conveniently at home; this
improves adherence and reduces system costs as compared to
physician office-based or infusion center-based administration
of injectable medications. Other combination products seek to
improve medication compliance, like the Abilify MyCite® digital
pill, which generates an electrical signal when exposed to
stomach fluid (an indication that the patient has swallowed the
pill).2 Yet there may be a more insidious purpose for designing

1. I will be using these terms to characterize all products with an
associated medical device, whether they be small-molecule drug, biologic, or
biosimilar; see 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (defining a “combination product” as “a product
comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device,
biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are physically,
chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single entity” or
separately packaged products intended to be used together). The term “drugdevice combination” does not adequately characterize the variety of medicinal
products that can be used in combination with a device. See also Philip E.
Alford, Rethinking FDA Regulation of Complex Products, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 477 (2020) (discussing other complex products, including drug-device
combinations).
2. Pam Belluck, First Digital Pill Approved to Worries About Biomedical
‘Big Brother,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/11/13/health/digital-pill-fda.html; see also Iñigo de Miguel Beriain & Marina
Morla González, ‘Digital Pills’ for Mental Diseases: An Ethical and Social
Analysis of the Issues Behind the Concept, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 2–3 (2020)
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devices for combination products: to thwart generic entry and
competition that would capture market share and cut into profit
margins.
For
brand-name
pharmaceutical
products,
the
manufacturer sets the list price at whatever the market will
bear;3 nine out of every ten dollars spent on pharmaceutical
products goes toward the purchase of brand-name drugs.4 The
most reliable way to lower drug prices is via the introduction of
generics, which end market monopolies and foster the
development of a competitive market for a particular product.5
Yet there is often much uncertainty as to when generic entry
will occur.6 Although regulatory and patent exclusivities can
help pinpoint an expected date of generic entry,7 manufacturers
often use a variety of anticompetitive strategies to delay generic
entry and extend market monopolies.8

(detailing how new systems like Abilify MyCite® can be used to facilitate
adherence to treatment); Matthew Avery & Dan Liu, Bringing Smart Pills to
Market: FDA Regulation of Ingestible Drug/Device Combination Products, 66
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 329, 330 (2011) (describing the development of smart pills
and the ensuing regulatory processes).
3. See generally Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari,
The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects
for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 858, 860 (2016) (describing the prescription
drug market in the United States and the causes of high prescription drug
prices).
4. ASSOCIATION FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES (AAM), THE U.S. GENERIC
& BIOSIMILAR MEDICINES SAVINGS REPORT 6 (2021), https://accessiblemeds.org
/sites/default/files/2021-10/AAM-2021-US-Generic-Biosimilar-MedicinesSavings-Report-web.pdf.
5. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 3, at 861 (explaining that the
pharmaceutical market does not function as a true free-market economy); see,
e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, When
Markets Fail: Patents and Infectious Disease Products, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
361, 361–62 (2018); Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 477–79 (2017).
6. See Reed F. Beall, Jonathan J. Darrow & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Approximating Future Generic Entry for New Drugs, 47 J.L. MED. ETHICS 177
(2019) (describing a method of estimating when generics will enter the market
in light of various confounding factors).
7. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha & Jerry Avorn, Determinants
of Market Exclusivity for Prescription Drugs in the United States, 177 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1658 (2017); see Beall et al., supra note 6.
8. See Gregory H. Jones, Michael A. Carrier, Richard T. Silver & Hagop
Kantarjian, Strategies That Delay or Prevent the Timely Availability of
Affordable Generic Drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD 1398 (2016)
(reviewing anticompetitive strategies that delay generic competition); see also
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Less understood is the role of device components of
medicinal products in (1) contributing to extended market
exclusivity and high drug prices; and (2) impeding the entry of
generic competitors. Generic competitors seeking to replicate
such combination products have taken two distinct paths. The
best-characterized pathway is the Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).9 However, the process by which a
manufacturer obtains ANDA approval for combination products
is more complex than the process for small-molecule drugs. This
process has been fraught with challenges—including rejected
applications—in part because of stringent requirements of
substantial similarity of device appearance and function.10
In light of these challenges for combination products,
generic competitors will often forgo the ANDA process in favor
of a new drug application (NDA) through the 505(b)(2) approval
pathway.11 Unlike the “standard” 505(b)(1) approval pathway,
505(b)(2) is designed for products for which components—
usually small-molecule drugs—are already FDA-approved and
have some data supporting their use.12 Though user fees for
505(b)(2) applications are higher than for ANDAs,13 applicants
are able to rely on safety and efficacy data from the original
manufacturer for 505(b)(2) approval, which reduces costs of preapproval studies. Recognizing that generics of combination
products with device components are more difficult to replicate
and study than small-molecule generics, the FDA created a

Kerstin Noëlle Vökinger, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet
Sarpatwari, Strategies That Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1666–67 (2017) (summarizing
manufacturers’ delay strategies); Chintan V. Dave, Michael S. Sinha, Reed F.
Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Estimating the Cost of Delayed Generic Drug
Entry to Medicaid, 39 HEALTH AFF. 1011, 1014 (2020) (“This study sought to
identify the prevalence of delayed entry, the reasons for the delays, and the
delays’ effects on Medicaid spending.”).
9. See Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drugapplication-anda (last accessed Dec. 11, 2021) (describing the ANDA pathway).
10. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a) (2020) (outlining how applicants receive a
“complete response letter” from the FDA upon rejection of an application or
abbreviated application).
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2021) (codification of the 505(b)(2) pathway).
12. See id.
13. Michael Mezher, FDA FY2021 User Fee Table, RAPS REGULATORY
FOCUS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/20
20/7/fda-fy2021-user-fee-table.

298

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

Center for Research on Complex Generics14 in August 2020 to
clarify the process for study and approval of such products.
Historically, most prescription drugs consisted of small
molecules with simple chemical structures that are generally
easy for generic manufacturers to replicate. Though brandname drugs sell for high prices during the protected market
exclusivity period, the expiration of exclusivity allows several
generic competitors to quickly enter the market, leading to
competition that has the effect of lowering drug prices
dramatically over time.15 Use of generic small-molecule drugs
has been credited with saving the United States health care
system nearly $2.4 trillion in the last decade.16
Biologic products have challenged this paradigm.
Biologics—which include protein-based therapeutics, including
cytokines, clotting factors, monoclonal antibodies, and
enzymes—accounted for more than one-third of all new FDA
approvals from 2015 to 2019.17 Biologics now comprise
14. See CTR. FOR RSCH. ON COMPLEX GENERICS AT THE UNIV. OF MD.,
BALT. & THE UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.complexgenerics.org/ (website for
Center for Research on Complex Generics); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GDUFA REAUTHORIZATION PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROGRAM
ENHANCEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2018–2022 25 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/med
ia/101052/download (noting that complex products include “complex drugdevice combination products (e.g., auto injectors, metered dose inhalers)”).
15. See Bo Wang, Jun Liu & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Variations in Time of
Market Exclusivity Among Top-Selling Prescription Drugs in the United States,
175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 635 (2015) (outlining the generic
availability of top-selling prescription drugs made available from 2000 to 2012);
see also Chintan V. Dave, Abraham Hartzema & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prices
of Generic Drugs Associated with Numbers of Manufacturers, 377 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2597 (2017) (showing that drug prices lower as the number of generic
manufacturers for that drug increase); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERIC
COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES (2019), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/centerdrug-evaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices;
Henry Grabowski, Genia Long, Richard Mortimer & Ani Boyo, Updated Trends
in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836, 843
(2016); IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER
BRANDED MEDICINES LOSE EXCLUSIVITY IN THE US (2016), https://www
.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/price-declines-after-brandedmedicines-lose-exclusivity-in-the-us.pdf.
16. See AAM, supra note 4, at 6.
17. CONG. BUDGET OFF., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 6 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/202104/57025-Rx-RnD.pdf. Supplemental data show that the average number of
BLA approvals per year from 2015–2019 was 12.0, compared to an average of
32.0 new molecular entities per year. Data Underlying Figures and Tables,
Supplemental Datasheet attached to Research and Development in the
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approximately 43% of United States spending on
pharmaceuticals.18 Responding to the rapid growth and
accelerating costs of biologics, the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2010 established a process for
the development and approval of follow-on biologics, more
commonly known as biosimilars.19 In an effort to address several
ongoing regulatory challenges, the FDA released its Biosimilars
Action Plan in July 2018.20
Similar to small-molecule generics, biosimilars can
partially rely on clinical data from the innovator product but are
also required to submit new data confirming that biosimilar
products have “no clinically meaningful differences” from the
original biologic.21 Although the United States has seen an
increase in biosimilar development and approval over the last
several years,22 the biosimilar marketplace has been slow to
produce robust cost savings,23 generating $8 billion in savings
in 2020; by 2025, spending on biosimilars is estimated to reach
$133 billion.24
This manuscript takes the following format: (1) a detailed
explanation of the various challenges to generic competition in
the combination product space; (2) a description and experience

Pharmaceutical Industry, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 8, 2021),
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/57025#data.
18. IQVIA INST., BIOSIMILARS IN THE UNITED STATES 2020–2024:
COMPETITION, SAVINGS, AND SUSTAINABILITY 3 (2020), https://www.iqvia.com//media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/iqvia-institute-biosimilars-in-the-unitedstates.pdf.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B) (2021).
20. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILARS ACTION PLAN: BALANCING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/114574
/download.
21. Id. at 5, n.5.
22. See Emily H. Jung, Ameet Sarpatwari, Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michael
S. Sinha, FDA and EMA Biosimilar Approvals, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1908, 1908 (2020) (describing development of new biosimilars in the United
States in recent years).
23. See Mike Z. Zhai, Ameet Sarpatwari & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Why Are
Biosimilars Not Living Up to Their Promise in the US?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS 668,
673 (2019) (advocating for greater biosimilar competition though they have not
yet yielded the predicted cost savings); see also Ameet Sarpatwari, Rachel
Barenie, Gregory Curfman, Jonathan J. Darrow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The
US Biosimilar Market: Stunted Growth and Possible Reforms, 105 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 92, 94–95 (2018) (showing that biosimilars
have, to date, only produced modest cost-savings).
24. See AAM, supra note 4, at 6; see also IQVIA INST., supra note 18, at 16.
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to date of the FDA’s 505(b)(2) NDA and “complex generic” ANDA
pathways as they pertain to combination products; (3) a series
of case studies (with data) that provide real-world perspective to
these market inefficiencies; and (4) proposed solutions for
Congress, the FDA, and other key stakeholders as they attempt
to address the high cost of prescription medications in the
United States, including expensive combination products.
II. DRUG PRICING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. DRUGS ARE PRICED AT WHATEVER THE MARKET WILL BEAR
When a new drug is approved by the Food and Drug
Administration, its list price is determined solely by the
manufacturer. In spite of federal funding for the development of
most new drug products,25 federal payers generally have little
input into whether to cover a drug and at what price. The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) can open a
National Coverage Determination analysis to decide whether—
and under what circumstances—to cover a new product, though
these proceedings are relatively rare.26 Additionally, there are
several statutorily defined categories for which federal coverage
is required.27 Finally, the federal government is prohibited by

25. Ekaterina G. Cleary et al., Contribution of NIH Funding to New Drug
Approvals 2010–2016, 115 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 2329, 2329 (2018) (a
study of new molecular entities approved from 2010–2016 finding that all 210
products benefited from NIH funding); see also Rahul K. Nayak, Jerry Avorn &
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Public Sector Financial Support for Late Stage Discovery
of New Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, 367 BRIT. MED. J. l5766 (2019)
(laying out public sector contributions made in later stages of new drug
development).
26. Medicare Coverage Determination Prices, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationPro
cess (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
27. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL CHAPTER 6, Sec. 30.2.5; see also Policy Proposal:
Revising Medicare’s Protected Classes Policy, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets
/2018/03/policy-proposal-revising-medicares-protected-classes-policy
(explaining which drugs Medicare Part D plans are required to cover under
federal statute).
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statute from negotiating prices for Medicare Part B28 and Part
D.29
Drug price increases also go largely unchecked. In some
cases, political uproar temporarily slows such increases, but the
price rarely falls during the monopoly period. In fact, when drug
price increases came under public scrutiny, manufacturers
lauded their “single-digit price increase pledges,” even though
many such increases were 9.9%.30 Generic drug prices can also
rise dramatically, especially in situations where there are three
or fewer manufacturers.31 Disgraced former pharmaceutical
company CEO Martin Shkreli made such price hikes famous,
leading to an investigation into sudden generic drug price
increases by the United States Senate Special Committee on
Aging.32
Unlike the common pharmaceutical company narrative
that high drug prices are meant to recoup the costs of research
and development, some have characterized the industry’s
staunch opposition to drug pricing legislation as “cry[ing]
Innovation Wolf”;33 that is, any proposal to reign in drug prices
is synonymous with bringing pharmaceutical innovation to a
screeching halt.34 In reality, research and development
28. Rena M. Conti, Francis J. Crosson, Alan Coukell & Richard G. Frank,
Reform Medicare Part B To Improve Affordability and Equity, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (June 25, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2021062
2.349716/full/.
29. PDP Regions; Submission of Bids; Plan Approval, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w111(i) (2021). This is commonly referred to as the Medicare Part D “noninterference clause.”
30. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Valeant Avoids Double-Digit Price Hikes with
9.9 Percent Increases, STAT NEWS (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.statnews
.com/pharmalot/2016/09/22/valeant-drug-prices-brent-saunders/
(explaining
how Valeant pharmaceuticals promised not to raise prices by more than single
digit percentage points and subsequently raised prices by 9.9%).
31. Frazer A. Tessema, Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michael S. Sinha, Generic
but Expensive: Why Prices Can Remain High for Off-Patent Drugs, 71
HASTINGS L. J. 1019, 1022 (2020).
32. Sen. Susan M. Collins & Sen. Claire McCaskill, Sudden Price Spikes
in Off-Patent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms
Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Health Care System, SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING FOR THE U.S. SENATE 1 (2016), https://www.aging.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/Drug%20Pricing%20Report.pdf.
33. Michael A. Carrier & Genevieve Tung, The Industry that Cries Wolf:
Pharma and Innovation, STAT NEWS FIRST OP. (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/26/innovation-boy-cried-wolf-pharmaindustry/.
34. Id.
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expenditures bear no relation to pricing of pharmaceuticals,35
and large pharmaceutical companies are seldom the ones
responsible for generating innovative new drugs.36 Product life
cycle management, including patent evergreening, is often
considered part of research and development expenditures but
is less about meaningful, patient-centered innovation and more
about the preservation of a revenue stream for lucrative
products.37 In response to legislative proposals and
Congressional hearings, pharmaceutical companies and
industry lobbying groups have significantly increased campaign
contributions to politicians, aimed at thwarting drug pricing
reforms.38
B. PATIENTS STRUGGLE TO AFFORD MEDICATIONS
A 2018 GoodRx survey found “that a full one-third of
Americans have trouble paying for their medication—forcing
them to borrow money, skip out on food or housing, or even not
fill their prescriptions altogether because of the expense.”39 And
a 2019 Kaiser Family Foundation survey noted that, as a result
of high drug prices, nearly three in ten adults do not take their
medications as prescribed.40 The most common responses were
35. See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Drug Prices Are Unrelated to Research and
Development Costs, HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.hh
pronline.org/articles/2016/12/21/drug-prices-are-unrelated-to-research-anddevelopment-costs (denying that pharmaceutical research and development
costs are responsible for the high price of prescription drugs).
36. Emily H. Jung et al., Do Large Pharma Companies Provide Drug
Development Innovation? Our Analysis Says No, STAT NEWS FIRST OP. (Dec.
10, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/10/large-pharma-companiesprovide-little-new-drug-development-innovation/.
37. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents,
Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1141, 1219 (2019)
(describing the “perverse incentives” that often drive the patent process, due in
part to current regulatory structures).
38. Lev Facher, More Than Two-Thirds of Congress Cashed a Pharma
Campaign Check in 2020, New STAT Analysis Shows, STAT NEWS (June 9,
2021), https://www.statnews.com/feature/prescription-politics/federal-full-data
-set/.
39. Thomas Goetz, Health Insurance Aside, Americans Still Struggle to
Pay for Their Medications, GOODRX HEALTH (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.good
rx.com/blog/health-insurance-aside-americans-still-struggle-to-pay-for-theirmedications/.
40. Kaiser Fam. Found., Poll: Nearly 1 in 4 Americans Taking Prescription
Drugs Say It’s Difficult to Afford Their Medicines, Including Larger Shares
Among Those with Health Issues, with Low Incomes and Nearing Medicare Age,
KFF NEWSROOM (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-
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failure to fill prescriptions, patient-driven substitution for
cheaper over-the-counter medications, cutting pills in half, or
skipping or rationing doses.41 A 2021 IQVIA Institute report
noted that “Patients were prescribed 55 million new therapy
prescriptions by their doctors, which they abandoned at the
pharmacy in 2020, about 9% of the total prescribed on average,
with increasing frequency as costs rise.”42 Cost affects
adherence to medication regimens: “[a]pproximately one in five
new prescriptions are never filled, and among those filled,
approximately 50% are taken incorrectly, particularly with
regard to timing, dosage, frequency, and duration.”43 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, this practice is not benign;
“nonadherence is associated with higher rates of hospital
admissions, suboptimal health outcomes, increased morbidity
and mortality, and increased health care costs.”44
III. COMBINATION PRODUCTS
As pharmaceuticals became increasingly complex,
particularly with regard to route of administration,
manufacturers developed solutions aimed at improving patient
experience. Many biologics cannot be taken orally, as the
gastrointestinal tract poses several barriers to systemic
absorption;45 such medications must therefore be infused or
release/poll-nearly-1-in-4-americans-taking-prescription-drugs-say-itsdifficult-to-afford-medicines-including-larger-shares-with-low-incomes/.
41. Id.
42. IQVIA INST. FOR HUM. DATA SCI., THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE U.S.
– SPENDING AND USAGE TRENDS AND OUTLOOK TO 2025 3 (2021),
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/the-use-ofmedicines-in-the-us/iqi-the-use-of-medicines-in-the-us-05-21-forweb.pdf.
43. Andrea B. Neiman et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Improving Medication
Adherence for Chronic Disease Management – Innovations and Opportunities,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes
/66/wr/mm6645a2.htm (citing Lars Osterberg & Terrence Blaschke, Adherence
to Medication, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 487 (2005)).
44. Id. (citing M. Robin DiMatteo, Variations in Patients’ Adherence to
Medical Recommendations: A Quantitative Review of 50 Years of Research, 42
MED. CARE 200 (2004)).
45. Julia Mantaj & Driton Vllasaliu, Recent Advances in the Oral Delivery
of Biologics, THE PHARMACEUTICAL J. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://pharmaceuticaljournal.com/article/research/recent-advances-in-the-oral-delivery-of-biologics
(identifying “barriers” such as the environment of the gastrointestinal tract,
including highly acidic stomach contents while noting that larger molecules
like antibodies cannot pass across the intestinal mucosa the way their small-
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injected. In other cases, such as for certain oncology drugs, selfadministration is not feasible, requiring the medications to be
delivered at designated infusion centers. Small-molecule drugs
like naloxone and epinephrine are often administered via
devices in a manner that allows for immediate pharmacologic
activity in life-threatening situations.46 Some of these products
have detailed instructions for use: the EpiPen is a multicolored
device with instructions clearly written on the packaging, and
Evzio is a pocket-sized device that reads directions aloud in
English, much like an automated external defibrillator (AED).
Innovations that allow such medications to be administered
safely and efficiently at home reduce health care expenditures.47
Combination products can also improve patient safety and
adherence. For instance, medications like insulin would
historically be dispensed to patients as a vial with a set of
syringes and needles.48 In some cases, an individual would need
to reconstitute the drug from powder and draw up appropriate
aliquots for each administration; in others, a specified number
of individual syringes would come with pre-filled quantities of
the drug for single use.49 Improvements in device technology
have automated much of the process. Now, in place of a messy
kit or bulky set of single-use syringes, a single “pen” may contain

molecule counterparts can); see also Ester Caffarel-Salvador et al., Oral
Delivery of Biologics Using Drug-Device Combinations, 36 CURRENT OP.
PHARMACOLOGY 8 (2017) (examining how orally administered devices could
allow clinicians to “engineer around” the barriers of the GI tract).
46. See infra Case Study 3. Naloxone, a strong opioid antagonist initially
developed as an intravenous medication, was reformulated to an intranasal
version for broader use, including emergency response and bystander rescue,
during overdoses due to opioid toxicity. Id. Epinephrine can be administered
via an intramuscular autoinjector, most commonly via the EpiPen autoinjector.
How EpiPen® Works, EPIPEN, https://www.epipen.ca/how-epipen-works (last
accessed Dec. 11, 2021).
47. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Farroni, Leonard Zwelling, Jorge Cortes & Hagop
Kantarjian, Saving Medicare through Patient-Centered Changes – The Case of
Injectables, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572 (2013) (arguing that the expansion of
medical insurance coverage to encompass self-administered injectable drugs
will reduce health care costs).
48. See Jothydev Kesavadev, Banshi Saboo, Meera B. Krishna & Gopika
Krishnan, Evolution of Insulin Delivery Devices: From Syringes, Pens, and
Pumps to DIY Artificial Pancreas, 11 DIABETES THERAPY 1251, 1252–53 (2020)
(describing the evolution of insulin delivery devices and the difficulties
historically faced by patients).
49. Id. at 1253 (explaining that pre-filled syringes are extremely common
in the inpatient setting but are now seldom used in the outpatient setting).
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enough doses to last days to weeks, with simplified techniques
for administration that reduce user error.50
As manufacturers have innovated to develop products for
self-administration, they have done so by developing their own
proprietary medical devices. The regulatory process can be
summarized as follows:
Combination products—whether a drug and device, a drug and
biological product, a biological product and device, or a product
combining all 3—are currently overseen by the Office of Combination
Products (OCP), which assigns investigational combinations to an
FDA center based on the component producing the combination’s
primary mode of action. Combinations deemed to be primarily drugs
are assigned to the Center of Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER),
biologics to the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER),
and devices to the Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDRH).51

Because officials from CDER and CBER may not have the
same level of expertise as CDRH officials when it comes to
reviewing medical devices, combination products reviewed by
CDER or CBER alone may not undergo a sufficiently thorough
review of the product’s device component.52 That said,
intercenter consultations are common for such products.53
A. LISTING OF PATENTS IN THE FDA’S “ORANGE BOOK”
In the late 1970s, the FDA acknowledged a trend toward
state repeal of anti-substitution legislation so long as substitute

50. Id. at 1254–56 (describing advancements in insulin delivery devices).
51. Bo Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Promoting Therapeutic Innovation:
What Do We Do About Drug-Device Combinations?, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 857
(2016). This paper will focus on combinations deemed to be primarily drugs and
biologics. Combinations deemed to be primarily devices, such as drug-eluting
cardiovascular stents and insulin infusion pumps, are outside the scope of this
paper.
52. For a drug-device combination that operates primarily as a device, like
a drug-eluting vascular stent, CDRH may expend more effort into reviewing
the structure and function of the device. For a drug-device combination like an
insulin pen, CBER may not spend adequate time evaluating the device
component. See Jordan Paradise, Insulin Federalism, 27 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 118, 170 (2021) (outlining problems that arise from the current legal and
regulatory framework surrounding biologic products).
53. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INTERCENTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH AND THE CENTER FOR DEVICES
AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH (1991) (exhibiting an agreement between the
CDER and CDRH to regulate certain products as devices and others as drugs).
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drugs were limited to a specific list.54 In response to state
requests that the FDA generate such a list, the agency created
its first book of “Approved Prescription Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations” in October 1980.55 The
book became colloquially known as the “Orange Book” due to its
bright orange cover and initial publication on October 31, 1980,
coinciding with Halloween.56
Initially, the Orange Book identified products with the
same active ingredient and the same strength, dose, and route
of administration. Upon being codified into law via the HatchWaxman Amendments,57 all holders of approved NDAs were
required to file “the patent number and expiration date of any
effective patents which claim the drug or a method of using such
drug” for listing in the Orange Book.58 This included drug
composition and formulation patents for all new and existing
NDAs.59
Because there were many off-patent drugs with few to no
competitors, the Hatch-Waxman Act also created the ANDA
pathway to expedite review and approval of generics, which
could then be listed in the Orange Book and subjected to state
substitution laws, thereby limiting brand-name market
dominance and increasing competition.60

54. Orange Book Preface, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www
.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last updated
Jan. 1, 2021) (referencing the specific list, known as the FDA’s “Orange Book,”
which delineates approved prescription products with therapeutic equivalence
evaluations).
55. Id.
56. Kendra Stewart, From Our Perspective: The Orange Book at 40: A
Valued FDA Resource Continually Enhanced by User Input, FDA NEWS &
EVENTS FOR HUM. DRUGS (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/newsevents-human-drugs/our-perspective-orange-book-40-valued-fda-resourcecontinually-enhanced-user-input.
57. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
58. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DRUG
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT: PRELIMINARY
GUIDANCE 4 (1984).
59. Letter from Harry Meyer Jr., FDA Ctr. for Drugs & Biologics Dir., to
the Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass’n (Mar. 26, 1985), https://www.fda.gov/media
/71454/download.
60. See H.R. Rep. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2647 (“The purpose of title I of the bill is to make available more low cost
generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure . . . .”).
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B. PRODUCT LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT
After drugs are approved, pharmaceutical companies often
engage in the practice of product lifecycle management, a
process by which additional patents are obtained on a product
in order to extend patent protection and forestall generic
entry.61
Upon the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, it
quickly became clear that patents were the key to extending
market exclusivity of lucrative drug products in the United
States. An unforeseen flaw in the Orange Book derives from the
process by which the FDA lists patents covering a particular
drug.62 Later-expiring patents delay generic competition
because Paragraph IV certifications and patent settlements
often leave those patents in force. For primary patents, which
cover the chemical compound, patent challenges often result in
settlement or affirmation of patent validity.
C. POSTMARKET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Empirical analyses of marketed drugs confirm that the
postmarket period for many marketed drugs consists of followon research and development closely tied to product lifecycle
management.63 One study evaluating postapproval trials for the
drug pregabalin (Lyrica) identified 238 trials for nonapproved
61. Vandana Prajapati & Harish Dureja, Product Lifecycle Management in
Pharmaceuticals, 12 J. MED. MKTG. 150 (2012); see also Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
62. See generally Alfred Engelberg, Unaffordable Prescription Drugs: The
Real Legacy of the Hatch-Waxman Act, STAT NEWS FIRST OP. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/12/16/unaffordable-prescription-drugs-reallegacy-hatch-waxman-act/ (describing the legacy of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
its impact on the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the United
States).
63. See Carole A. Federico et al., Assessment of Pregabalin Postapproval
Trials and the Suggestion of Efficacy for New Indications: A Systematic Review,
179 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 90 (2018) (“After a drug receives
regulatory approval, researchers often pursue small, underpowered trials,
called exploratory trials, aimed at testing additional indications.”); see also
Benjamin Carlisle et al., Benefit, Risk, and Outcomes in Drug Development: A
Systematic Review of Sunitinib, 108 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1 (2016) (identifying
115 postmarket studies testing sunitinib for nonapproved indications); see also
Benjamin Carlisle et al., Patient Benefit and Risk in Anticancer Drug
Development: A Systematic Review of the Ixabepilone Trial Portfolio, MEDRXIV
(2020) (identifying sixty-two publications testing ixabepilone for nonapproved
indications, with an additional fifty-five trials registered in ClinicalTrials.gov).
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indications, many of which were exploratory and intended to
generate supplemental uses for the drug.64 Many of these
studies were inconclusive, but such studies can still drive offlabel use, even if data supporting those uses is limited.65
Importantly, obtaining a “method of use” patent for a
particular product may pose a barrier to generic entry, even if
that use is not FDA-approved.66 That is, a postmarket study
could be insufficient to justify approval of a supplemental
indication from the FDA, but might be enough for the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue a
“method of use” patent.67 Several thousand patients are enrolled
in these exploratory trials, with few positive outcomes and
multiple replicated negative studies, suggesting that
inefficiencies in postmarket research and development have real
implications for patients.68 Risks may outweigh benefits in
many cases, which wastes resources while unnecessarily
exposing patients to harm.69
D. EVERGREENING: SECONDARY AND TERTIARY PATENTS
This highlights a second important aspect of product
lifecycle management: evergreening.70 The concept is aptly

64. See generally Federico et al., supra note 63 (outlining the study).
65. Federico et al., supra note 63, at 95. Manufacturers drive off-label use
of prescription drugs by promoting those products directly to physicians and
payers. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha, Jerry Avorn & Ameet
Sarpatwari, Pharmaceutical Policy in the United States in 2019: An Overview
of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421,
464–66 (2019).
66. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 1001, 1005 (2017) (“Such ‘method of use’ patents can be quite important:
if an inventor finds a new use for an old drug, she can get a patent on the new
method for using the drug even though she cannot get a patent on the drug
itself.”).
67. See Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual
Property Incentives, Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 24–26 (2020) (discussing incentives for drug repurposing).
68. James Mattina, Benjamin Carlisle, Yasmina Hachem, Dean Fergusson
& Jonathan Kimmelman, Inefficiencies and Patient Burdens in the
Development of the Targeted Cancer Drug Sorafenib: A Systematic Review,
PLOS BIOLOGY, Feb. 3, 2017, at 2.
69. Id. at 15.
70. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 170–78 (2012); see also
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B.
Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001) (explaining the difficulty of
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defined by Rebecca Eisenberg as follows: pharmaceutical
manufacturers adopt “evergreening strategies that add new
patents to their quivers as old ones expire,” and in doing so,
“prolong their effective periods of patent protection.”71 By
adding patents or exclusivities to a product’s portfolio,
manufacturers can effectively dissuade generic competition by
implementing structural barriers to market entry.72 An analysis
of pharmaceutical patent evergreening from 2005 to 2015
revealed that 78% of new patents listed in the Orange Book
covered existing drugs, with over 70% of the top 100 bestselling
drugs obtaining at least one extension of market exclusivity.73
1. Secondary Patents
Secondary patents cover aspects of a drug such as its
formulation, method of use, or minor structural modifications
such as enantiomers, prodrugs, or salts.74 Unlike primary
patents on the new chemical entity or new molecular entity,
which are generally filed and issued prior to FDA approval,
many secondary patents are filed and issued after approval.75
Even though secondary patents are thought to be more
vulnerable to invalidation in patent challenges, they are
commonly invoked to delay market entry of generics.76 One
study of the HIV medications ritonavir [Norvir] and
lopinavir/ritonavir [Kaletra] identified 108 patents which would
have delayed generic competition until 2028, a full thirty-nine
navigating the “patent thicket” of overlapping existing patent rights when
developing new products).
71. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007); see also Erika Lietzan, The
“Evergreening” Metaphor in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 53 AKRON L.
REV. 805 (2019) (explaining the concept of “evergreening”).
72. Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 590, 597 (2018). The data for this analysis, covering Orange Book
patents from 2005–2015, was made public. Robin Feldman, Orange Book Data
Dictionary, Supplemental Datasheet attached to Identifying Extensions of
Protection in Prescription Drugs: Navigating the Data Landscape for LargeScale Analysis, OPENICPSR (Dec. 7, 2018), https://doi.org/10.3886
/E104781V2.
73. Feldman, supra note 72, at 596.
74. Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Emiprical Analysis of “Secondary”
Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2012); see also Kesselheim, Sinha,
Avorn & Sarpatwari, supra note 65, at 439.
75. Kapczynski et al., supra note 74, at 5.
76. Kapczynski et al., supra note 74, at 2.
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years after the first patents on ritonavir were filed.77 Though
generic versions of ritonavir are now available, patents for three
other combination medications containing ritonavir expire as
late as 2035.78
2. Tertiary Patents
Recently, scholars have described a new category of
pharmaceutical patents for combination products: patents
covering the drug delivery device component.79 One study found
that these so-called “tertiary patents” extend patent protection
by a median of 4.7 years; for forty-four of the forty-nine drugs
studied, tertiary patents were the last to expire.80 The number
of drug-device products listed in the FDA’s Orange Book nearly
doubled from 2005 to 2016, with a concomitant increase in
tertiary patents from sixty-one to 478.81 Tertiary patents have
become increasingly important to patent evergreening
strategies; in 2016, one in four combination products had only
tertiary patents remaining in the Orange Book.82 These tertiary
patents expired later than other patent types and, had they not
been listed in the Orange Book, would have allowed generics to
enter the market a median of 3.4 years sooner.83 These later77. Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be
Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286 (2012).
78. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (41st ed. 2021) [hereinafter
ORANGE BOOK] (providing patent data for Viekira Pak, Viekira XR, and
Technivie).
79. Reed F. Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Tertiary Patenting on DrugDevice Combination Products in the United States, 36 NAT. BIOTECHNOLOGY
142, 142 (2018); see also George Horvath, Emergent Regulatory Systems and
Their Challenges: The Case of Combination Medical Products, 94 WASH. L. REV.
1967 (2019) (analyzing medical product regulatory systems, their cohesiveness,
and the balance between safety, efficacy, innovation, and timely access).
80. Reed F. Beall, Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan & Amir Attaran,
Is Patent “Evergreening” Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination
Products?, PLOS ONE, Feb. 24, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone
.0148939 (exploring whether extended patent protection on drug delivery
devices corresponds with therapeutic improvements).
81. Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 79, at 142.
82. Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 79, at 142–43 (identifying three major
factors contributing to an increase in tertiary patents: (1) tertiary patents
growing role in combinatorial product patent portfolios, (2) a growing subset of
combinatorial products filing tertiary patents, and (3) the same products
accruing tertiary patents over time).
83. Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 79, at 142–43.
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filed tertiary patents suggest that manufacturers continue to
innovate the device even after the product has entered the
market, with several redesigned devices flagged for recall by the
FDA as having a “defective delivery system.”84 Because tertiary
patents cover mechanical aspects of the device, they may be less
prone to invalidation as compared to secondary patents, which
cover variants of a drug that may later be found to be non-novel
or obvious, such as an enantiomer or salt of a drug.85
E. COST OF DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATION PRODUCTS
Of the top twenty medicines by non-discounted spending in
2019, seven have associated devices.86 Combined, these seven
drugs alone have gross sales of $208.9 billion from 2015 to
2019.87
Table 1. Gross Sales for Seven Blockbuster
Pharmaceuticals (by 2019 United States Sales) that
Possess a Device Component.88
PRODUCT

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

TOTAL

Humira

$10.1b

$13.5b

$16.3b

$18.4b

$21.4b

$79.7b

Enbrel

$7.2b

$7.6b

$7.9b

$8.0b

$8.1b

$38.8b

Stelara

$2.0b

$2.6b

$3.7b

$5.0b

$6.6b

$19.9b

Trulicity

$0.3b

$1.2b

$2.7b

$4.5b

$6.5b

$15.2b

Lantus Solostar

$5.8b

$5.5b

$4.8b

$4.3b

$4.3b

$24.7b

Symbicort

$2.7b

$3.0b

$3.1b

$3.5b

$3.9b

$16.2b

Victoza 3-Pak

$2.0b

$2.4b

$2.9b

$3.5b

$3.6b

$14.4b

84. Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 79, at 144.
85. See, e.g., In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18-2086, 2020
WL 728628 (1st Cir. Feb. 13, 2020) (challenging the improper listing of the
device patent in the Orange Book rather than the patent’s validity).
86. IQVIA INST. FOR HUM. DATA SCI., MEDICINE SPENDING AND
AFFORDABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2020), https://www.iqvia.com//media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-reports/medicine-spending-and-affordability-inthe-united-states.pdf.
87. Infra Table 1.
88. IQVIA INST. FOR HUM. DATA SCI., supra note 86.
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F. COMPETITION AND DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATIONS
In many ways, the Hatch-Waxman Act can be characterized
as a success. Prior to the law taking effect, generics represented
19% of all drugs dispensed, and only 35% of off-patent drugs
faced generic competition.89 By 2020, generics represented nine
out of every ten prescriptions and accounted for only 18.1% of
prescription drug spending.90 Generics saved consumers and
payers $338 billion in 2020.91
Brand-brand competition rarely results in substantial
savings to consumers.92 In fact, price increases of many
competitor products have appeared to rise in lock-step, raising
the specter of anti-competitive behavior.93 Manufacturers often
argue that they increase prices in order to compete with
competitors for preferred tiering on major pharmacy benefit
manager (PBM) formularies; rebates are often calculated as a
percentage of the list price, meaning that list price increases are
the clearest path to PBMs.94
In the combination product space, personal preference and
familiarity with use may make brand loyalty more common.95
89. Michael A. Carrier, Mark A. Lemley & Shawn Miller, Playing Both
Sides? Branded Sales, Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy, 71 HASTINGS L. J.
307, 313 (2020) (internal citations omitted) (describing the market-based
impact of generic drugs).
90. See AAM, supra note 4, at 6. The remaining 10% of prescriptions are
for brand-name products, which account for a whopping 81.9% of prescription
drug spending. Id.
91. AAM, supra note 4, at 6.
92. See, e.g., Ameet Sarpatwari, Jonathan DiBello, Marie Zakarian, Mehdi
Najafzadeh & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Competition and Price Among BrandName Drugs in the Same Class: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, PLOS
MED., July 30, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002872 (finding
that brand-brand competition “will likely not result in lower drug prices absent
structural reforms”).
93. Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Accused of Fixing Prices on Insulin, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/health
/drugmakers-lawsuit-insulin-drugs.html (detailing price fixing allegations
against Sanofi, Novo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly regarding insulin products,
company response, and the role of pharmacy benefit managers).
94. See Elizabeth Seeley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Pharmacy Benefit
Managers: Practices, Controversies, and What Lies Ahead, COMMONWEALTH
FUND ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites
/default/files/2019-03/Seeley_pharmacy_benefit_managers_ib_v2.pdf
(explaining the controversies and concerns surrounding “PBM business
practices” and solutions).
95. Jing Luo & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Evolution of Insulin Patents and
Market Exclusivities in the USA, 3 LANCET DIABETES & ENDOCRINOLOGY 835,
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Physicians are often reluctant to switch patients to other
products because of usability concerns.96 In generic smallmolecule drug markets, it is fairly common to find ten or more
generic competitors. A study found that 63% of novel smallmolecule drugs in encapsulated or tablet form have four or more
generic approvals.97 Blockbuster combination products,
however, rarely have the same degree of competition.98
Competition is even less likely for biologics—biosimilar-device
combinations differ in both therapeutic and device
components—which has driven some degree of skepticism
among physicians and patients, mirroring the skepticism that
once plagued small-molecule generics decades ago.99
IV. GENERICS FOR COMBINATION PRODUCTS
Given that combination products are increasingly common
but the marketplace for generics remains small, the FDA has
837 (2015) (identifying patents covering insulin products, including
formulation and pen-device patents).
96. See Louise Heron et al., Perceptions of Usability and Design for
Prefilled Insulin Delivery Devices for Patients With Type 2 Diabetes, 26
DIABETES SPECTRUM 16 (2013) (“[Healthcare Practitioners] understand patient
preferences and therefore may be able to adjust their prescribing decisions to
meet these preferences.”); see also Jerome S. Fischer et al., United States
Patient Preference and Usability for the New Disposable Insulin Device
Solostar® Versus Other Disposable Pens, 2 J. DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1157
(2008) (comparing patient preference and usability of various insulin injection
devices).
97. See Ravi Gupta, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Nicholas Downing, Jeremy
Greene & Joseph S. Ross, Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 HatchWaxman Act, 176 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1391, 1392 (2016)
(explaining that, for drugs with at least a single generic competitor, the median
number of generic competitors is seven; then noting that 17% of all drugs
eligible for generic competition had no generic competition). For an analysis of
mitigating factors that contribute to increasing generic drug prices, see
Tessema et al., supra note 31.
98. See ALEX BRILL, POTENTIAL SAVINGS FROM ACCELERATING US
APPROVAL OF COMPLEX GENERICS (2021), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites
/default/files/2021-02/Potential-Savings-Complex-Generics-Feb2021.pdf
(defining complex generics as “copies of non-biologic medicines that have a
complex molecular base, route of delivery, formulation, or dosage form; . . . a
drug-device combination product; or [a product with] other particularly
complex approval requirements.”); see Alford, supra note 1, at 478–79.
99. Zhai et al., supra note 23, at 671–72 (internal citations omitted) (citing
a 2016 national survey where 55% of physicians “did not believe that
biosimilars were safe and appropriate for use in patients” and a 2018 Citizen
Petition to the FDA expressing doubt and confusion regarding the safety and
efficacy of biosimilars).
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prioritized the review and approval of complex generics—
intended to compete with combination products—by offering
guidance to industry for developing such products.100 The FDA
placed an additional evidentiary requirement for complex
generics; substantial duplication of the medical device.101 In
particular, the FDA was concerned about the usability of
medical device components of combination products: “the use of
human factors and usability engineering . . . plays a key role in
maximizing the likelihood that the device will be safe and
effective for use by the intended users, for the intended uses,
and for the intended use environments.”102 In doing so, the
agency pointed to the need “to ensure that use-related hazards
associated with the product are eliminated or mitigated to
reduce patient adverse events and medication errors
attributable to use-related errors.”103 In drafting this guidance,
the FDA may have also considered statutory requirements of
label equivalency with the brand-name product.104
However
well-intentioned,
greater
evidentiary
requirements for complex generics have hindered competition in
the combination products market because devices are often very
difficult to replicate in practice.105 In fact, there are several
complex generics that have been approved by regulatory
agencies in Canada and Europe but not the United States,
contributing to between $600 million and $1.7 billion annually
in excess spending.106

100. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES AND RELATED
CLINICAL STUDY CONSIDERATIONS IN COMBINATION PRODUCT DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT (2016) [hereinafter FDA HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES]; see also
Scott Gottlieb, Reducing the Hurdles for Complex Generic Drug Development,
FDA VOICES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices
/reducing-hurdles-complex-generic-drug-development
(outlining
FDA
initiatives aimed at market competition for the purposes of mitigating drug
price increases).
101. See infra Case Study 1.
102. FDA HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES, supra note 100, at 4.
103. Id. at 5.
104. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2021) (requiring all differences in sideby-side comparisons, including Medication Guides, to be annotated and
explained).
105. BRILL, supra note 98, at 3–4 (“Due to the inherent complexity of
manufacturing these products, the expected number of generic competitors is
generally one, two, or perhaps three.”).
106. BRILL, supra note 98, at 7 (noting that savings may have been realized
had the FDA approved the ANDAs quicker).
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Given the challenges associated with replicating a
combination product’s medical device to an acceptable degree of
specificity, many companies appear to have either abandoned
the idea of pursuing an ANDA or shifted their development
strategy toward the 505(b)(2) NDA pathway. Depending on the
goals of pursuing a competitor product, each pathway has its
advantages and disadvantages.
A. INTERCHANGEABILITY AND AUTOMATIC SUBSTITUTION
Currently, there are two primary mechanisms by which
manufacturers can develop competitor products with the same
active ingredients as marketed drug-device combinations. The
first is the approval of a “complex generic” via the traditional
ANDA, the pathway by which generic small-molecule drugs are
approved.107 A second is via the 505(b)(2) new drug application
pathway, which allows a rival company to rely on published data
from marketed products as part of its application.108 In some
circumstances, the 505(b)(2) pathway may be a particularly
appealing alternative to an ANDA, because instead of being
required to replicate the brand-name device to a high degree of
specificity, the generic manufacturer could simply develop its
own drug delivery device or repurpose existing technology
controlled by the manufacturer, such as comparable devices.
Instead of generating an interchangeable complex generic via
the ANDA pathway, the 505(b)(2) product can effectively be
thought of as a brand-name “generic.” Often accompanied by its
own market exclusivity period, the product may need to be
heavily promoted by the manufacturer in order to gain market
share. For this reason, ANDAs—and not 505(b)(2)s—are the
most plausible route to lower drug prices, because generic smallmolecule drugs can be automatically substituted at the
pharmacy level in all fifty states, and no distinction is made in
most cases for drug-device combinations.109
107. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2021).
108. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2021) (describing the (b)(2) application as “an
application submitted under [Section 505(b)(1)]”).
109. See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009,
1017–19 (2010) (conditioning a no-strings substitution on the generic receiving
an “AB-rating,” meaning it must be “therapeutically equivalent,” and
describing factors to consider in equivalence, including bioequivalence); see also
Paradise, supra note 52, at 122–23 (discussing the Biologics Competition and
Price Innovation Act (BPCIA) and guidance for interpreting bioequivalence).
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V. THE 505(B)(2) PATHWAY
Established under the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the
505(b)(2) NDA pathway allows applicants to rely in part on data
submitted for a previous NDA.110 The idea was to allow drug
companies to improve versions of existing drugs (i.e., updated
formulations or new uses) through a separate market incentive.
In fact, the 505(b)(2) pathway has increasingly been utilized for
approval over time; by 2004, there were more approved
applications via the 505(b)(2) pathway than the traditional
505(b)(1) pathway for new molecular entities, a trend that has
continued to this day.111
A. EFFECT ON COMPETITION AND PRICE
Depending on the circumstances, there may be commercial
advantages to pursuing a 505(b)(2) application. One
pharmaceutical consulting firm describes the 505(b)(2) pathway
as “a [potentially] much less expensive and much faster route to
approval, compared to a traditional development path.”112
There is also a lower burden on the manufacturer to
generate new data for the regulatory submission, particularly
data from clinical trials. All applications rely on data from a
previously approved product (often referred to as the “reference
listed drug” or RLD), but in lieu of additional studies, many will
obtain data from other sources, such as peer-reviewed scientific
journals.113 This means fewer clinical studies, less time to
approval, and lower risk of rejection given reliance on data from
approved products. Finally, many of these products receive the

110. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2021) (explaining the requirements for a
(b)(2) application).
111. Jonathan J. Darrow, Mengdong He & Kristina Stefanini, The 505(b)(2)
Drug Approval Pathway, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 405 fig. 1, 413 fig. 9 (2019).
The 505(b)(2) pathway is most commonly used for FDA Classification Codes 3
(New Dosage Form), 4 (New Combination), and 5 (New Formulation or New
Manufacturer). Id. at 406.
112. What is 505(b)(2)?, CAMARGO PHARM. SERVS. BLOG, https://
camargopharma.com/resources/what-is-505b2/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2022)
(presenting an overview of the §505(b)(2) application process).
113. See, e.g., Kristi Norris & Lisa Crose, Dramatically Decrease Drug
Development Costs Through Literature-Only 505(b)(2) NDA Submissions,
CAMARGO PHARM. SERVS. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://camargopharma.com/resources
/blog/dramatically-decrease-drug-development-costs-literature-505b2-ndasubmissions/ (identifying fourteen approved literature-only 505(b)(2) NDAs).
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same Hatch-Waxman regulatory exclusivity periods as
505(b)(1)-approved drugs.114
Despite these benefits, there are also drawbacks. FDA user
fees are higher for brand-name products than generics.115
Similarly, there is less market penetration because 505(b)(2)approved
products
do
not
immediately
receive
interchangeability designations, which would allow for
automatic substitution at the pharmacy.116 Successful complex
generic ANDAs receive AB ratings in the Orange Book, whereas
505(b)(2)-approved combination products generally receive a BX
rating.117
With these considerations in mind, why might a
manufacturer choose the 505(b)(2) pathway? Instead of being
required to replicate a brand manufacturer’s device to the
degree of specificity the FDA requires for complex generics,118
the manufacturer can simply develop work-around devices once
active ingredient patents expire. This saves time and expense
associated with reverse engineering and serial testing of
devices—including human factors studies119—and allows for the

114. See Darrow et al., supra note 111, at 410 (42% (231 of 553) of 505(b)(2)
applications in the study sample received some form of regulatory exclusivity).
115. See Mezher, supra note 13 (in 2021, NDAs not requiring clinical data
cost $1.4 million in user fees, whereas ANDAs cost just under $200,000).
116. See infra Case Study 1. Another classic example is EpiPen. See, e.g.,
Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer & Andy Kiersz, EpiPen’s Skyrocketing Prices Can’t Be
Blamed on No Competition, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www
.businessinsider.com/epipen-prescriptions-auvi-q-adrenaclick-2016-9 (noting
that competitors Twinject, Adrenaclick, and Auvi-Q failed to gain market share
over the years). All three were approved via the 505(b)(2) pathway. Id.
117. See Norris & Crose, supra note 113. One interesting exception to this
rule is the 505(b)(2)-approved testosterone gel product marketed by Perrigo
Company plc. Despite opposition from AbbVie, the maker of brand-name
AndroGel, the Perrigo product was granted an AB rating. FDA Grants AB
Rating to 505B2 NDA Generic, PHARM. DEV. GRP. (Aug. 1, 2014),
https://pharmdevgroup.com/fda-grants-ab-rating-505b2-nda-generic/
[hereinafter PHARM. DEV. GRP.]. A 505(b)(2) testosterone gel product from Teva
was granted a BX rating and the company ultimately decided against
marketing it. Id.; see also FTC v. AbbVie Inc., No. 2:14-cv-05151-HB (E.D. Pa.
2018) (discussing these facts in the context of a court ruling on an FTC suit
against AbbVie).
118. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., Approval Letter 21-077, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 24, 2000), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat
fda_docs/nda/2000/21077_Advair%20Diskus_Approv.pdf [hereinafter Approval
Letter 21-077].
119. See generally FDA HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES, supra note 100 (“This
document provides guidance to industry and FDA Staff on the underlying
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use or repurposing of devices for which the generic
manufacturer may have separate intellectual property
protections. These associated time and cost savings may make
the 505(b)(2) pathway far more lucrative by decreasing barriers
to market entry.120
VI. THE FDA AND COMPLEX GENERICS: 3 CASE
STUDIES
The challenge of developing generic combination products
has been a recent priority for the FDA: in October 2017, the
agency announced an initiative to improve the ANDA
submission process for complex generic drugs, intended to
diminish regulatory uncertainty that may otherwise deter
generic manufacturers from attempting to enter the market.121
In 2020, the FDA finalized guidance for its pre-ANDA program,
intended to “clarify regulatory expectations for prospective
applicants early in product development, assist applicants to
develop more complete submissions, promote a more efficient
and effective ANDA review process, and reduce the number of
review cycles required to obtain ANDA approval, particularly
for [complex products].”122
Meeting types include product development meetings, presubmission meetings, and mid-review-cycle meetings.123 As
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb noted in 2017, “because
brand-name versions of complex drug products are often higherpriced than many other brand name drugs, any steps we can
take to encourage the development of generic competitors to
complex drugs will have an outsized impact on access, and
prices.”124
This section will consist of three case studies: (1)
fluticasone/salmeterol [Advair]; (2) adalimumab [Humira]; and
principles of human factors (HF) studies during the development of
combination products . . . .”).
120. The epinephrine entry in the 2021 Orange Book is demonstrative. See
ORANGE BOOK, supra note 78, at 3–363 (showing Adrenaclick and Auvi-Q have
BX ratings while the newer ANDA-approved generic epinephrine autoinjector
from Teva has an AB rating).
121. Gottlieb, supra note 100.
122. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN FDA AND
ANDA APPLICANTS OF COMPLEX PRODUCTS UNDER GDUFA: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 2 (2020) (internal citations omitted).
123. Id. at 3–5.
124. Gottlieb, supra note 100.
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(3) naloxone [Narcan and Evzio]. Other important examples,
like the epinephrine autoinjector [EpiPen]125 and insulin
devices,126 tell similar stories but have been covered in detail
elsewhere.
A. CASE STUDY 1: FLUTICASONE/SALMETEROL [ADVAIR DISKUS]
Indicated for severe asthma and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, fluticasone propionate/salmeterol xinafoate
[Advair Diskus] is a brand-name inhaled combination
corticosteroid and long-acting beta-agonist.127 The product was
initially approved by the FDA in August 2000 and awarded
three years of regulatory exclusivity as a new combination.128
The primary patent for fluticasone was issued in 1982; the
primary patents for salmeterol were issued between 1991 and
1993.129
The last of these primary patents was set to expire in
August 2008, but a series of patents on the Diskus® drug
delivery device extended patent exclusivity—and therefore, the
product’s market monopoly—until 2016.130 This occurred
through the procurement of tertiary patents covering the
combination product’s delivery device and listing of those

125. See Jacob S. Sherkow & Patricia J. Zettler, EpiPen, Patents, and Life
and Death, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 173–180 (2021) (exploring
contributing factors to EpiPen’s pricing and competition, including patents on
the epinephrine autoinjector).
126. See generally Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 95 (explaining how patents
impact access to insulin in the United States).
127. Drug Label: Advair Diskus, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www
.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2019/021077s061lbl.pdf (last visited
Jan. 13, 2022).
128. Approval Letter 21-077, supra note 118.
129. The patent for fluticasone expired in 2003, while patents for salmeterol
expired between 2008 and 2010. See Androstane carbothioates, U.S. Patent No.
4,335,121 (filed Feb. 13, 1981) (issued June 15, 1982) (expired in 2003);
Phenethanolamine derivatives, U.S. Patent No. 4,992,474 (filed Aug. 23, 1989)
(issued Feb. 12, 1991) (expired in 2008); Phenethanolamine derivatives, U.S.
Patent No. 5,126,375 (filed Nov. 29, 1990) (issued June 30, 1992) (expired in
2009); Phenethanolamine derivatives having β2 -adrenoreceptor selective
stimulant action, U.S. Patent No. 5,225,445 (filed Feb. 19, 1992) (issued July 6,
1993). An additional method of use patent expired in 2010. See Medicaments,
U.S. Patent No. 5,270,305 (filed Sept. 3, 1991) (issued Dec. 14, 1993) (expired
in 2010).
130. See Beall et al., supra note 80, at 4 tbl. 1 (showing patent protection
extensions for the Diskus drug delivery device granted through August 2016).
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patents in the Orange Book.131 In fact, the manufacturer (GSK)
applied these device patents to other combination products by
packaging other drugs with delivery devices that differed only
in terms of color: fluticasone propionate [Flovent Diskus], and
salmeterol xinafoate [Serevent].132
The challenges associated with developing complex generics
for Advair were anticipated by the FDA early on. In response to
a perceived lack of clarity around the ANDA approval process
for Advair generics, the FDA issued a draft guidance in
February 2013—three years before anticipated expiration of
market exclusivity—recommending four additional studies for
ANDA approval and delineating criteria for each.133 The FDA
sought to ensure that competitor products would be
“qualitatively . . . and quantitatively . . . the same” as the
Advair Diskus with respect to inactive ingredients and device
characteristics:134
 “Passive (breath-actuated) device
 Pre-metered multi-dose format
 60 doses
 External operating procedures consisting of (1) Open, (2)
Click, (3) Inhale, and (4) Close
 Similar size and shape to the [reference] product
 Comparable device resistance to the [reference] product
 Dose counter”135
In February 2016, a second draft guidance addressed
complex generic product design more broadly, focusing on

131. Nine additional patents, all titled “Inhalation device,” were filed
between 1995 and 2005. The last of these, covering the “medicament pack”
containing powdered fluticasone and salmeterol, expired in 2016. U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS 949–50 (30th ed. 2010).
132. Id. at 945–46, 1038. Identical in function and operation, the only
difference is the color of the devices. The Advair Diskus is purple, the Flovent
Diskus is orange, and the Serevent Diskus is green. See D. McDanel & K.
Schleich, Treating Asthma and COPD: Chart of Inhaled Medications, U. IOWA,
https://www.healthcare.uiowa.edu/familymedicine/fpinfo/Docs/Inhaler%20cha
rt%20pdf2.pdf (providing images of the mentioned devices and their respective
colors).
133. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON FLUTICASONE
PROPIONATE; SALMETEROL XINAFOATE (2013).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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human factors studies—studies intended to evaluate whether
patients can use the complex generic device properly without
serious problems or use errors.136
The Advair Diskus is a blockbuster drug with over $100
billion in lifetime sales,137 yet there are only three market
competitors containing fluticasone and salmeterol in 2021:
products made by Mylan, Hikma, and Teva.138
1. Mylan’s Wixela Inhub
Soon after the final Diskus device patent expired in early
2016, Mylan submitted its ANDA for the Wixela Inhub.139
Before the FDA could make its determination on Mylan’s
application, Sandoz—a rival manufacturer also seeking to
produce a complex generic of Advair—submitted a Citizen
Petition in October 2016 encouraging the FDA to reject all
pending Advair Diskus ANDA applications until the agency
could clarify “inadequacies” in its 2013 Advair draft guidance.140
Recent studies have demonstrated that Citizen Petitions from
manufacturers often delay approval of competitor products;
Sandoz’ petition may have been intended to delay Mylan’s
approval until it could get its own generic fluticasone/salmeterol
product to market.141 The FDA denied the Sandoz petition in
March 2017 and rejected Mylan’s ANDA later that month,
issuing the company a Complete Response Letter (CRL).142
136. See FDA HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES, supra note 100.
137. James Paton, Glaxo’s Advair Is the $100 Billion Asthma Drug That
Won’t Die, BLOOMBERG (May 4, 2018), https://www.bloombergquint.com
/business/glaxo-s-advair-is-the-100-billion-asthma-drug-that-won-t-die.
138. Search Results from Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm
(search “fluticasone” and “salmeterol”).
139. Press Release: Mylan’s ANDA for Generic Advair Diskus® Accepted for
Filing
by
FDA,
MYLAN
PHARMACEUTICALS
(Feb.
19,
2016),
https://investor.mylan.com/index.php/news-releases/news-release-details
/mylans-anda-generic-advair-diskusr-accepted-filing-fda.
140. Anthony Maffia & Sandoz, Inc., Citizen’s Petition from Sandoz Inc. to
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
(Oct. 13, 2016), REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/document
/FDA-2016-P-3356-0001.
141. See generally Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions:
Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305 (2016) (exploring
how brand firms can use Citizen Petitions to delay market entry of generic
medicines, resulting in higher prices to consumers).
142. See FDA Declines to Approve Mylan’s Generic of GSK’s Advair For Now,
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mylan-fda-
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FDA designated Mylan’s ANDA as requiring a major
amendment, which results in delays associated with a revised
application and FDA response.143 After Mylan’s ANDA received
a second CRL from the FDA in January 2018, the Wixela Inhub
was FDA-approved via the ANDA pathway in January 2019.144
Three weeks into its launch, Mylan captured nearly one quarter
of the market, and at a list price 70% lower than Advair.145
More competition is on the way: Sandoz and Hikma have
closely followed Mylan’s pursuit of a complex generic. Each
company has similarly had ANDA submissions rejected by the
FDA but have continued to pursue complex generics for
fluticasone/salmeterol.146 Hikma’s product received FDA
approval in December 2020,147 though Sandoz remains
unsuccessful to date.
2. Teva’s AirDuo
In its pursuit of a competitor to the Advair Diskus, Teva
took the alternative regulatory approach, receiving approval
through the 505(b)(2) pathway for its own fluticasone/salmeterol
product (AirDuo® Respiclick) in January 2017. Teva also
produced an authorized generic (a product identical to the

advair/fda-declines-to-approve-mylans-generic-of-gsks-advair-for-nowidUSKBN1702LC (“Both analysts think it’ll be awhile before the
GlaxoSmithKline respiratory knockoff does win approval, especially if Mylan
has additional work to do.”).
143. Carly Helfand, With Mylan Tight-lipped on Generic Advair Setback,
Analysts Survey the Damage, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www
.fiercepharma.com/pharma/mylan-mum-advair-crl-details-analysts-surveydamage.
144. FDA Approves Generic Inhalation Treatment for Asthma, COPD,
PHARMACY TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/view
/fda/approves-generic-inhalation-treatment-for-asthma-copd.
145. Ned Pagliarulo, Mylan’s Advair Generic Pressures GSK with Strong
Launch, BIOPHARMADIVE (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com
/news/mylan-advair-generic-gsk-strong-launch/550093/.
146. Tracy Staton, Bad News for Novartis, Good for GlaxoSmithKline:
Sandoz’ Advair Copy Stiff-armed at FDA, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/bad-news-for-novartis-good-for-glaxosandoz-advair-copy-stiff-armed-at-fda; Hikma Advair Diskus ANDA delayed as
FDA issues CRL, THE PHARMA LETTER (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www
.thepharmaletter.com/article/hikma-advair-diskus-anda-delayed-as-fdaissues-crl.
147. Hikma Launches Generic Advair Diskus® Following FDA Approval,
HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.hikma.com/media
/2868/ww40040_advair-approval-pr-with-label-vfinal.pdf.
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AirDuo but with a generic label), and in response, GSK launched
its own authorized generic of Advair, manufactured by Prasco
Laboratories; both products launched in April 2017.148 Teva
received approval for an additional fluticasone/salmeterol
product, the AirDuo® Digihaler, in July 2019.149
Since Teva did not pursue an ANDA approval, neither
AirDuo nor its authorized generic can be automatically
substituted by a pharmacy receiving a prescription for “Advair
Diskus.” Market share therefore depends on astute prescribers
to write prescriptions for “Teva AirDuo,” requiring Teva to
aggressively promote its product to prescribers, payers, and
patients in order to gain market share.
3. GSK’s Product Hop: Advair HFA
In the meantime, GSK sought to protect a portion of its
revenues and market share for the Advair Diskus by obtaining
approval for a new Advair product, the Advair HFA inhaler.150
The Advair HFA product represents a product hop,
characterized by FDA approval and market launch of a related
product, generally with a later-expiring market exclusivity
148. Eric Sagonowsky, Pressuring GSK’s Advair, Teva Launches Both
AirDuo RespiClick and Authorized Generic, FIERCEPHARMA (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/putting-pressure-advair-tevalaunches-airduo-respiclick-and-authorized-generic; Prasco Press Release,
PRASCO LABORATORIES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://prasco.com/news/2019/prascolaunches-the-authorized-generic-of-advair-diskus-(fluticasone-propionate-andsalmeterol-inhalation-powder).html.
149. Teva Announces FDA Approval of AirDuo® Digihaler™ (fluticasone
propionate 113 mcg and salmeterol 14 mcg) Inhalation Powder, TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS (July 15, 2019), https://www.tevapharm.com/news-andmedia/latest-news/teva-announces-fda-approval-of-airduo-digihaler-fluticason
e-propionate-113-mcg-and-salmeterol-14-mcg-/ (describing the product as
follows in their press release: “AirDuo® Digihaler™ contains built-in sensors
that detect when the inhaler is used and measure inspiratory flow rates. This
data is then sent to a companion mobile app using Bluetooth® Wireless
Technology so that patients can review their data over time, and if desired,
share it with their healthcare providers. Patients can also schedule reminders
on their smartphone to take their AirDuo® Digihaler™ as prescribed”).
150. There was a push in the 1980s to eliminate chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
propellants from respirators for environmental concerns; the replacement
propellent, hydrofluoroalkane (HFA), is now raising similar concerns. Sarah
DeWeerdt, The Environmental Concerns Driving Another Inhaler Makeover,
581 NATURE 14 (2020). Product hops due to these changes have prolonged
market exclusivity of respiratory devices for decades. See id. (describing the
tension between striving for a smaller carbon footprint and maintaining patient
access to needed devices).
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period, in an effort to preserve market share of particularly
lucrative branded products.151 With patents extending market
exclusivity for Advair HFA until 2031, GSK has been
strategically shifting market share from the Advair Diskus to
the Advair HFA, corresponding to a soft switch.152 The latestexpiring patents for the Advair Diskus and the Advair HFA are
both device patents; the Advair HFA patent covers the dose
counter.153

151. The most concerning of product hops are hard switches, which result
when a manufacturer seeks to switch users to the new product before
discontinuing the old product. More insidious but perhaps equally
anticompetitive are soft switches, in which a manufacturer introduces a new
variant of its drug product (usually with extended market exclusivity) and
gradually switch patients over to that formulation before its flagship product
loses exclusivity and faces generic competition. In the soft switch scenario, the
flagship product is not discontinued prior to entry of generic competition, but
promotion and marketing are often shifted toward prescribing of the new
product.
152. See infra Figure 1.
153. Inhalation device, U.S. Patent No. 5,873,360 (filed June 6, 1995)
(issued Feb. 23, 1999); Actuation indicator for a dispensing device, U.S. Patent
No. 7,500,444 (filed June 19, 2003) (issued Mar. 10, 2009).
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Figure 1. Expiration of Orange Book-Listed Patents for AdvairBranded Fluticasone/Salmeterol Products154

154. Michael S. Sinha, Complex Generics: The Case of Advair at the Annual
Symposium, Harvard-MIT Center for Regulatory Science (Apr. 2, 2019).
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As generic entry has driven down Advair’s market share,
GSK now offers drug coupons promoting a $10 monthly copay
while encouraging patients to ask their physicians to prescribe
brand-name Advair.155 On its main website, it also warns
patients that pharmacies may switch them to a generic, asking
the question, “Are you sure you’re getting the same medicine in
the Diskus inhaler?”156 The website also explains that the
product is “Available Two Ways,” recommending either the
brand-name Diskus or its authorized generic, marketed as “the
same medicine in the exact same Diskus inhaler.”157

Figure 2. Advair Website.158

The claims on the product website may have the effect of
generating skepticism about complex generic competitors to
Advair. Also, both the Advair Diskus and the authorized generic

155. GSK Pricing Information, GSK, https://www.gskforyou.com/gskpricing-information/ (last accessed Nov. 30, 2021).
156. Asthma and COPD treatment | Advair (fluticasone propionate and
salmeterol), ADVAIR, https://www.advair.com (last accessed Aug. 27, 2021).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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are purple; the product’s design, including color, seems intended
to foster brand loyalty among physicians and patients.159
4. Impact on Market Share
The Advair Diskus held considerable market share as late
as 2019.160

Figure 3 (continued on next page). Medicaid and Medicare Part D
Spending on Fluticasone/Salmeterol Combination Products.161

159. Just as AstraZeneca’s “purple pill” (first omeprazole [Prilosec], then
esomeprazole [Nexium]) was intended to generate brand loyalty and may have
generated skepticism of non-purple generic alternatives, the distinctive purple
color of the Advair Diskus may also foster skepticism about complex generics
like Mylan’s Wixela Inhub. See generally Ameet Sarpatwari & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, The Case for Reforming Drug Naming: Should Brand Name
Trademark Protections Expire upon Generic Entry?, PLOS MED., Feb. 9, 2016
(discussing the merits of allowing generic drug products to adopt the name of
their brand name counterpart); Jeremy A. Greene & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Why
Do the Same Drugs Look Different? Pills, Trade Dress, and Public Health, 365
NEW ENG. J. MED. 83 (2011).
160. See infra Figure 3.
161. Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
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Figure 3 (continued).

Market share of the two Advair-branded products in
Medicare Part D was 82% as compared to market share of 69%
in Medicaid.162 This difference could be explained by increased
prescribing of Wixela Inhub and authorized generics in
Medicaid. The authorized generic of Advair, manufactured by
Prasco, claimed a 10% market share in Medicaid compared to
7% in Medicare Part D.163 Teva’s authorized generic claimed a
7% market share in Medicaid as compared to only 1% in

Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Information-onPrescription-Drugs/MedicarePartD [hereinafter Medicare Part D Drug
Spending Dashboard & Data] (follow hyperlink; click “Access the Medicare
Part D Drug Spending Dashboard”); Medicaid Drug Spending Dashboard,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Information-onPrescription-Drugs/Medicaid
[hereinafter
Medicaid
Drug
Spending
Dashboard] (follow hyperlink; click “Access the Medicaid Drug Spending
Dashboard”). Hikma’s product is too new to be reflected in available spending
data.
162. Supra Figure 3.
163. Id.

2022]

GENERIC DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATIONS

329

Medicare Part D.164 The ANDA-approved Wixela Inhub has
captured 14% share in Medicaid and 10% in Medicare Part D;
by contrast, the Teva AirDuo captured less than 1% in both
markets, representing just under $1 million (before rebates).165
These differences between Medicare Part D and Medicaid may
be driven by greater cost containment and utilization control
policies in Medicaid, such as favorable placement of lower-cost
products—including authorized generics—on preferred drug
lists or formularies.166
Importantly, Medicare Part D spending in 2019 ($2.09
billion before rebates) was over four times as much as 2019
Medicaid spending ($495 million before rebates).167 The product
hop to Advair HFA has also been modestly successful, as it
represented 23% of Medicaid spending and 13% of Medicare
Part D spending in 2019, with total combined spending (before
rebates) of $389.3 million.168
5. Impact on Price
The wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) and average
wholesale price (AWP) for fluticasone/salmeterol products is
shown in Table 2.169 Other than the AirDuo authorized generic,
the AWP is fairly similar across products, implying limited early
cost savings to payers from the use of complex generics like
Wixela Inhub. From February 2001 to January 2018, the
average wholesale price of the Advair Diskus 250/50 increased
by over 360%; however, no new price increases were documented
since 2018.170 Since its launch in 2008, the AWP of the Advair
HFA 115/21 has increased by over 220%.171

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Medicaid Prescription Drug Laws and Strategies, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health
/medicaid-pharmaceutical-laws-and-policies.aspx (discussing various ways
legislators could modify how the pharmacy benefit in their state Medicaid
program is administered).
167. See Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note
161; Medicaid Drug Spending Dashboard, supra note 161.
168. Id.
169. IBM MICROMEDEX RED BOOK [hereinafter REDBOOK] (search by
Active Ingredient and enter “fluticasone/salmeterol” in the search bar).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Table 2. WAC and AWP for Medium-Strength
Fluticasone/Salmeterol Products.172
Product Name

WAC

AWP

Advair Diskus 250/50

$ 393.93

$ 472.72

Advair HFA 115/21

$ 405.75

$ 486.90

AirDuo Digihaler 113/14

$ 399.00

$ 478.80

AirDuo Respiclick 113/14

$ 350.33

$ 420.40

Teva Authorized Generic 113/14

$ 95.40

$ 119.25

Prasco Authorized Generic 250/50

$ 354.15

$ 444.36

Wixela Inhub 250/50

$ 116.44

$ 449.08

6. Lessons
The Advair experience highlights several lessons for FDA
as it evaluates its approach to complex generics for drug-device
combinations. First, the rigor of its specifications for replicating
the Advair Diskus may have delayed the Mylan and Hikma
ANDA approvals by over two years, with other manufacturers
facing continued delays. The same issue happened when Teva
attempted to replicate Mylan’s EpiPen.173 Though the Sandoz
Citizen Petition in that case was also denied, it may have
hindered Teva’s progress toward a successful ANDA
approval.174 Precise duplication of the device component may fit
the statutory requirements of the ANDA and its labeling, but
the added clinical value to patients of an exact replica device
may not be substantial.
The fluticasone/salmeterol experience reveals several
impediments to robust market competition and lower prices: (1)
172. Id.
173. At that time, Mylan filed a Citizen Petition with the FDA detailing
differences in function between the two devices that it found problematic, and
although the Citizen Petition was denied, Teva’s complex generic was rejected
later that month. See generally Sherkow & Zettler, supra note 125 (describing
EpiPen patent and market competition issues, including the FDA’s role in drugdevice combination products).
174. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 141, at 308 (providing a
comprehensive review of Citizen Petitions from 2011–2015, which identified
that 92% of petitions were filed by competitors, 92% were rejected, and 39%
were filed within six months of market exclusivity expiration).
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tertiary patents obtained by GSK that delayed market entry by
several years; (2) challenges in ANDA development by Mylan
and others that unintentionally extended the market exclusivity
period for Advair Diskus; and (3) limited market penetration
and price decreases overall.
B. CASE STUDY 2: ADALIMUMAB [HUMIRA]
Adalimumab is a monoclonal antibody, first approved by
the FDA in December 2002 to treat rheumatoid arthritis.175
Supplemental indications were later approved for a variety of
other inflammatory conditions, including “psoriatic arthritis,
ankylosing spondylitis, Crohn’s disease, plaque psoriasis,
juvenile idiopathic arthritis, ulcerative colitis, pediatric Crohn’s
disease, hidradenitis suppurativa, and uveitis.”176 To date,
adalimumab has generated over $170 billion in worldwide net
revenue, including $107 billion from United States payers
($16.1 billion in the United States in 2020 alone).177
Adalimumab’s key United States patent expired in 2016.178
1. Adalimumab Patent Thicket
Over the course of several decades, AbbVie has developed a
thicket of patents that has undermined efforts by competing
firms to market approved biosimilar products.179 Unlike the
Orange Book, which first listed patents in 1985,180 the Purple
175. U.S. H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION: ABBVIE – HUMIRA AND IMBRUVICA 1 (2021), https://oversight
.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Committee%20on%20Ove
rsight%20and%20Reform%20-%20AbbVie%20Staff%20Report.pdf [hereinafter
DRUG PRICING INVESTIGATION].
176. Id. (citing Food and Drug Administration, Approved Label for Humira
(Mar. 2020) (online at www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2020
/125057s415lbl.pdf)).
177. Id. at 3.
178. U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382 (filed Feb. 9, 1996) (expired Dec. 2016); see
also Global $2.27 Billion Adalimumab, Infliximab and Etanercept Biosimilars
Market to 2030, RSCH. & MKTS. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.globenewswire
.com/en/news-release/2021/02/03/2168810/28124/en/Global-2-27-BillionAdalimumab-Infliximab-and-Etanercept-Biosimilars-Market-to-2030.html.
179. See I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED SPECIAL EDITION: HUMIRA,
(rev. 2020), https://www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/i-mak.humira
.report.3.final-REVISED-2020-10-06.pdf (discussing how AbbVie built its
Humira patent portfolio to delay competition).
180. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT, supra note 58 and
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Book Database of Licensed Biological Products only recently
began listing patent information in June 2021, pursuant to the
Biological Product Patent Transparency amendments to the
BPCIA.181 That said, the exact number of patents in AbbVie’s
Humira portfolio is not readily knowable.
A 2018 report estimated that AbbVie owns over 110
unexpired patents for adalimumab, including approximately
fourteen on its formulation, twenty-four on methods of
manufacture, twenty-two on methods of treating particular
diseases, and fifteen on other aspects of its technology (including
device and diagnostics).182 That number may be an
underestimate: antitrust litigation proceedings from 2020 and
2021 allege that 130 patents have been issued for Humira out of
nearly 250 filed patent applications.183 Eighty-nine percent of
those patents were filed after adalimumab was approved in
2002, with nearly 50% of applications filed since 2014.184 In the
absence of settlements, these patents would delay competition
on adalimumab for over four decades since the first patents were
filed.185
2. Biosimilars for Adalimumab
Because adalimumab is a biologic, it is not subject to the
same regulatory processes as small-molecule drug-device
combinations. Instead of deciding whether to pursue a follow-on
product via the ANDA or 505(b)(2) pathways, biosimilar
accompanying text (describing the process for submitting patents for new
drugs).
181. List and Description of Patents, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3) (2021); Newly
Issued or Licensed Patents, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(7) (2021) (discussing the
licensing and regulation of biological products).
182. RICHARD GONZALEZ, ABBVIE LONG-TERM STRATEGY (2015),
http://www.biopharmalaw.com/uploads/9/9/2/4/99243734/abbvie_humira_pate
nt_strategy.pdf; see also Humira: How to Develop a Strong Patent Portfolio in
the AIA and BPCIA Era, BIOPHARMA L. GRP. PLLC (Apr. 11, 2018),
http://www.biopharmalaw.com/blog/humira-how-to-develop-a-strong-patentportfolio-in-the-aia-and-bpcia-era (discussing AbbVie’s financial strategies for
success and how it has used numerous Humira patents to its advantage).
183. Brief and Short Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, UFCW Local
1500 Welfare Fund v. AbbVie Inc., No. 20-02402, (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2020); see also
I-MAK, supra note 179, at 3 (examining the 247 patent applications filed for
Humira).
184. I-MAK, supra note 179, at 3 (discussing AbbVie’s patent monopoly on
Humira).
185. I-MAK, supra note 179, at 3 (explaining AbbVie’s strategy of delaying
competition).
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manufacturers have a separate pathway for FDA approval.186
Biologics are generally produced from living organisms, with
complex molecular structures and elaborate synthetic
pathways.187 This creates technical challenges to their
discovery, manufacture, storage, packaging, administration,
and use.188 As such, the cost to develop biosimilars is estimated
to be quite high.189 While it may cost $1 to $5 million over a few
years to develop a generic version of a small-molecule drug, it
may cost hundreds of millions of dollars over as long as ten years
to develop a biosimilar.190
Biosimilar manufacturing challenges may be further
complicated by the existence of trade secrets, a form of
intellectual property protection that protects manufacturing
processes or other secret business information.191 Unlike
patents, trade secret protection does not expire, but it would not
prevent competition by businesses that independently develop
equivalent processes through work-arounds.192 Some have
proposed regulatory and legislative remedies to facilitate
disclosure of trade secrets by biologics manufacturers.193
However, when the FDA approved the first Humira biosimilar
in 2016 (adalimumab-atto, Amjevita), it denied AbbVie’s Citizen

186. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2021).
187. What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluat
ion-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers.
188. How to Address the Challenges of Biologics Discovery and Development,
LABIOTECH.EU (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.labiotech.eu/partner/challengesbiologics-development/.
189. Id.
190. Henry G. Grabowski, Rahul Guha & Maria Salgado, Regulatory and
Cost Barriers are Likely to Limit Biosimilar Development and Expected Savings
in the Near Future, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1048 (2014); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N,
EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION
14 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerginghealth-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commissionreport/p083901biologicsreport.pdf (discussing the expansion of the biosimilar
market and the barriers that biosimilar manufacturers face).
191. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Drug Development: Are Trade
Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?, 348 SCIENCE 188 (2015).
192. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and
Patents Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285 (2011).
193. See Price & Rai, supra note 191, at 189 (proposing joint FDA and
congressional action to spur innovation, such as lengthening regulatory
exclusivity periods).
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Petition claiming that trade secrets and other confidential
commercial information in the company’s biologics license
application (BLA) would be used to benefit biosimilar
manufacturers.194 Seven adalimumab biosimilars have been
approved as of December 2021.195
3. Patent Challenges and Settlements
Because biologics are larger and structurally more complex
than small-molecule drugs, they may be protected by many more
patents. The absence of patent information in FDA’s Purple
Book has historically made it challenging for potential
biosimilar manufacturers to assess the development challenges
and litigation risk associated with entering the market. Like
generic manufacturers, biosimilar manufacturers must often
pursue one of two remaining options: wait for all patents to
expire or attempt to overturn the patents in court. For
adalimumab and other biologics with highly lucrative markets,
biosimilar manufacturers have considerable financial incentive
to develop biosimilars despite the high likelihood of patent
infringement litigation. There are two primary processes by
which biosimilar manufacturers (and other interested parties)
can challenge biologic patents.
4. Patent Dance
Under the BPCIA, before an FDA-approved biosimilar is
able to enter the United States marketplace, a process known as
the “patent dance” often occurs.196 Although more than one

194. See Kurt R. Karst, FDA Licenses First Humira Biosimilar; Denies
AbbVie Petition on Fifth Amendment Takings, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.thefdalawblog.com/2016/09/fda-licenses-first-humira-biosimilardenies-abbvie-petition-on-fifth-amendment-takings/ (denying Citizen Petition
because the information at issue was publicly available); see also Abbott
Laboratories (Covington & Burling LLP), Citizen Petition, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2012-P-0317-0001.
195. FDA-Approved Biosimilar Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2022). The seven adalimumab biosimilars are adalimumab-atto
[Amjevita], adalimumab-adbm [Cyltezo], adalimumab-adaz [Hyrimoz],
adalimumab-bwwd [Hadlima], adalimumab-afzb [Abrilada], adalimumab-fkjp
[Hulio], and adalimumab-aqvh [Yusimry]. Id.
196. In the dance, the biosimilar company provides its license application to
the innovator company, which in turn examines the application for potential
patent infringements. Alejandro Menchaca, The Inner Workings of the BPCIA
Patent Dance, AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE: THE CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (July 24,
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patent can be challenged in a single lawsuit, the large numbers
of patents in biosimilar disputes substantially increases the
complexity, expense, and uncertainty of the proceedings,
potentially deterring some biosimilar manufacturers from even
attempting to enter the market. In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court recently ruled that the provision of a biosimilar
company’s license application to the innovator company is
optional and that the 180-day notification period could begin
before the biosimilar receives FDA approval.197
After Amgen developed Amjevita and sought to enter the
market in 2016, it faced a court challenge over sixty-one
adalimumab patents.198 A second case from 2017 alleged that
Boehringer-Ingelheim’s biosimilar Cyltezo infringed seventyfour adalimumab patents, including several that had been
issued in the twelve-month period since the Amgen litigation
was initiated.199 Importantly, the patent dance limits the
number of patents challenged in the first round of litigation,
requiring the plaintiff and the defendant in each case to agree
to litigate only the ten (Amgen) and eight (BoehringerEngelheim) most important patents at issue in the cases.200
Though this may make the judicial process more efficient and
less costly, it does not adequately facilitate challenges to
Humira’s vast patent estate. Further, settlements leave these
patents intact, so the patent dance has yet to chip away at
AbbVie’s patent portfolio.

2021), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/the-inner-workings-of-thebpcia-patent-dance. The biosimilar company must also give the innovator
company a 180-day notification before marketing its product. Id.
197. Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); see also Ameet
Sarpatwari, Abbe R. Gluck & Gregory D. Curfman, The Supreme Court Ruling
in Sandoz v Amgen: A Victory for Follow-on Biologics, 178 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
INTERNAL MED. 5 (2018) (analyzing the potential impact of Sandoz v. Amgen
and concluding that it may help reduce prices and expand patient access to
biosimilars).
198. Complaint, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00666-MSG, (D. Del.
Aug. 4, 2016).
199. Complaint, AbbVie, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., Civil
No. 1:17-cv-01065-MSG, (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2017); see also Jeffrey Wu & Claire
Wan-Chiung Cheng, Into the Woods: A Biologic Patent Thicket Analysis, 19
CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 93, 111 (2020) (describing the litigation).
200. See Complaint, AbbVie Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00666-MSG, (D.
Del. Aug. 4, 2016); Complaint, AbbVie, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.,
Inc., Civil No. 1:17-cv-01065-MSG, (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2017).
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5. Inter Partes Review
Recognizing the proliferation of patents and the high costs
of patent litigation across all fields of technology, Congress in
2011 created a new administrative procedure for challenging
patents: inter partes review (IPR).201 The process takes place
before three experienced administrative patent judges of the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)—a body within the
United States Patent and Trademark Office202—and is
generally a quicker and cheaper alternative to litigation.203
However, only a single patent can be challenged per IPR
proceeding, making its use in the biologics space potentially
cumbersome. Even if some patents are successfully invalidated,
any remaining patents could still block biosimilar entry. Despite
its limitations, use of IPR has proven extremely popular among
patent challengers, with over 1429 challenges in fiscal year
2020, including ninety-eight related to chemical technology and
seventy-eight related to biopharmaceutical technology.204
Multiple biosimilar manufacturers have pursued IPRs of
adalimumab patents, but these petitions have led to mixed
results. In 2017, the PTAB struck down one such patent in
response to a challenge by Coherus BioSciences, but several
other IPRs brought by Sandoz, Amgen, and Coherus were
unsuccessful.205
201. Jonathan J. Darrow, Ameet Sarpatwari & Gregory Curfman, Battling
Over Patents: The Impact of Oil States on the Generic Drug Industry, 19 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 250 (2020). Though increasingly used with mixed
success, inter partes review is also controversial. The industry has lobbied to
exempt pharmaceutical and biologic patents from review, and the procedure
recently survived a constitutionality challenge before the United States
Supreme Court. See Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (upholding the constitutionality of inter partes
review under Article III and the Seventh Amendment); see also Darrow,
Sarpatwari & Curfman, supra (analyzing the aftermath of Oil States and the
burgeoning role of inter partes review in the pharmaceutical sector).
202. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2018) (describing the process of inter partes
review).
203. Jonathan J. Darrow, Reed F. Beall & Aaron S Kesselheim, Will Inter
Partes Review Speed US Generic Drug Entry?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
1139 (2017).
204. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS: FY20 END OF
YEAR OUTCOME ROUNDUP IPR, PRG, CBM (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup.pdf.
205. ROTHWELL FIGG, BIOSIMILARS IPR DASHBOARD: HUMIRA
(ADALIMUMAB) (2018), https://www.biosimilarsip.com/wp-content/uploads/sites
/768/2018/12/IPR-Dashboard.pdf.
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6. AbbVie Product Hops
The initial adalimumab products were packaged as prefilled syringes in various doses.206 Four years after the initial
approval of adalimumab, AbbVie launched the Humira pen;207
in 2018, it launched a revamped Humira pen in collaboration
with Eisai.208 Though the pens may have the effect of
simplifying self-administration by patients, they also have the
added benefit of extending the market monopoly of Humira
products through the addition of tertiary patents to the product
patent portfolio.
In an effort to mitigate the impact of biosimilar entry,
AbbVie has also developed new product lines for Humira.209 In
addition to creating starter packs for different indications,
AbbVie created a citrate-free formulation of Humira, which it
has aggressively advertised since its approval in July 2018.210
The citrate-free formulation is offered at a higher concentration
than regular Humira, and the lack of a citric acid buffer and a
higher concentration reportedly lessens pain after use.211
Promotion of the citrate-free formulation is highly visible at the
top of AbbVie’s Humira website.212 Importantly, Humira

206. Infra Figure 4.
207. Id.
208. Abbott Laboratories Receives FDA Approval For New HUMIRA®
Delivery Device, BIOSPACE (June 26, 2006), https://www.biospace.com/article
/releases/abbott-laboratories-receives-fda-approval-for-new-humira-r-deliverydevice-/; see also AbbVie and Eisai Announce the Launch of HUMIRA® Pen,
and Auto-Injector Formulation for Fully Human Anti-TNF-a Monoclonal
Antibody HUMIRA®, EISAI (June 11, 2018), https://www.eisai.com/news
/2018/news201846.html.
209. In addition to new versions of Humira, AbbVie has also introduced new
biologic products risankizumab [Skyrizi] and upadacitinib [Rinvoq] to capture
additional market share that may be lost to adalimumab biosimilars. See Walid
F. Gellad & Chester B. Good, Adalimumab and the Challenges for Biosimilars,
322 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2171 (2019).
210. Tony Hagen, Adalimumab Biosimilars Face Product Obsolescence
Before Launch, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www
.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/adalimumab-biosimilars-face-productobsolescence-before-launch (asserting that AbbVie’s monopoly on Humira is
delaying other biosimilar manufacturers from bringing products to the
market).
211. HUMIRA Citrate-Free, HUMIRA, https://www.humira.com/content/dam
/humira/citrate-free/documents/pdf/Humira-citrate-free-discussion-guide.pdf
(last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
212. Infra Figure 5.
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Citrate-free has new associated patents, which will extend
exclusivity beyond 2023.213

Figure 4. Different Formulations of Humira214

213. Hagen, supra note 210; see also Andrew Storaska, Getting Lost in the
Thicket: AbbVie Wields Its Expansive Humira® Patent Portfolio Against
Alvotech’s Adalimumab Biosimilar, JD SUPRA (June 25, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/getting-lost-in-the-thicket-abbvie1123576/ (arguing that Alvotech’s new biosimilar product infringed on AbbVie’s
patents). See generally Ellen t’Hoen, Humiragate: AbbVie’s Desperate Attempts
to Keep its Monopoly, MEDS. L. & POL’Y (Mar. 27, 2019), https://
medicineslawandpolicy.org/2019/03/humiragate-abbvies-desperate-attemptsto-keep-its-monopoly/ (noting that trade unions and drug companies “are suing
AbbVie for using patent dispute settlement agreements to obstruct competition
in the market.”).
214. Instructions for Use: Humira Single-Use Pre-Filled Syringe, HUMIRA,
https://www.humira.com/content/dam/humira/global/documents/pdf/humirasy
ringe_PIL.pdf.
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Figure 5. Humira Website215

215. Humira® (adalimumab) | A Biologic Treatment Option, HUMIRA,
http://www.humira.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2022); HUMIRA (adalimumab)
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Collectively, the impact will likely be as follows: by the time
biosimilar adalimumab products enter the market in 2023,
AbbVie will have successfully shifted patients over to other
AbbVie products that are not interchangeable with existing
biosimilars, thereby preserving substantial market share.216
7. Price Considerations and Market Share
Since 2003, the AWP of Humira has been increased twentyseven times, reflecting an increase of nearly 550% in nineteen
years.217 According to I-MAK, AbbVie stands to gain an
estimated $77 billion from 2018 to 2023 by delaying market
entry of biosimilars through settlement agreements.218 In 2019,
adalimumab accounted for $3.72 billion in sales (before rebates)
in Medicare Part D and $2.25 billion in sales (before rebates) in
Medicaid.219

Citrate-Free | Official HCP Site, HUMIRA, https://www.humiradermpro.com
/citrate-free (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
216. See Zachary Brennan, UPDATED: Boehringer Nabs FDA’s First
Interchangeability Designation for its Humira Competitor – But Will it Matter?
ENDPOINTS NEWS (Oct. 18, 2021), https://endpts.com/boehringer-nabs-fdasfirst-interchangeability-designation-for-its-humira-competitor-but-will-itmatter/.
217. REDBOOK, supra note 169 (search results by Active Ingredient and
enter “adalimumab” in search bar); see also DRUG PRICING INVESTIGATION,
supra note 175, at 4.
218. I-MAK, HUMIRA’S PATENT WALL 5–6 (2020), https://www.imak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Humira-deck-2020-10-22.pdf.
219. Infra Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Market Share of Humira Products as a Percentage of
Total Adalimumab Spending, Medicaid and Medicare Part D,
2019.220
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Based on 2019 spending, citrate free formulations of
Humira have collectively captured 39% of the market share for
Medicare Part D and 53% of the market share for Medicaid.221
AbbVie has kept pricing of citrate free formulations on par with
its predecessors; AWP unit pricing between regular and citratefree formulations is equivalent and has been increased by the
same percentages annually.222 In the last few years, AbbVie has
begun removing certain Humira formulations from the market,
which could constitute hard switches since biosimilars have yet
to enter the market.223 By delaying biosimilar entry until 2023,
AbbVie gave itself a grace period to switch users over from
regular to citrate-free formulations of Humira. For those users,
biosimilar entry of regular formulations may not result in lower
prices.
And
without
automatic
substitution
or
interchangeability, brand loyalists may choose to stick with
Humira, especially if patient out-of-pocket costs are comparable.
Indication-specific starter packs have separate NDC codes and
are reported separately in Medicare Part D and Medicaid
dashboards.224 In Medicare Part D, approximately threequarters of the starter packs were for citrate free
formulations.225
Given that adalimumab biosimilars have yet to enter the
market, there are no realized costs savings due to biosimilars.
This is because settlement agreements with nine companies—
six of which have approved adalimumab biosimilars—extend to
the year 2023, so market competition may change dramatically

220. Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note 161;
Medicaid Drug Spending Dashboard, supra note 161.
221. See Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note
161. Each calculation includes spending on citrate-free starter packs.
222. REDBOOK, supra note 169 (search by active ingredient and enter
“adalimumab” in search bar). For instance, all products increased in price by
7.4% in January 2021. Id.
223. REDBOOK, supra note 169. According to REDBOOK, four Humira
products were deactivated in 2019 and 2020 (identified by national drug
classification code, NDC): 00074-3799-06 (deactivated May 8, 2019); 000743799-03 (deactivated May 28, 2019); 00074-6347-02 (deactivated Dec. 24, 2019);
and 00074-9374-02 (deactivated Mar. 30, 2020). Id.
224. See Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note
161.
225. Id. There were 5109 beneficiaries of citrate free formulations in 2019,
compared to 1849 beneficiaries of regular formulations. Id.
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at that point.226 With AbbVie’s considerable market switch to
citrate-free formulations, there are questions as to whether the
approved adalimumab biosimilars will still be relevant in
2023.227
Table 3. AbbVie Settlements with Would-be Humira
Challengers and Anticipated Launch Dates. 228
Company/Partner

Drug Name

Launch Date

Amgen

Amjevita*

January 2023

Samsung Bioepis / Merck

Hadlima*

June 2023

Boehringer Ingelheim

Cytelzo*

July 2023

Hulio*

August 2023

Sandoz

Hyrimoz*

September 2023

Fresenius Kabi

MSB11022

September 2023

Pfizer

Abrilada*

November 2023

Momenta

M923

December 2023

Coherus

CH-1420

December 2023

Mylan / Fujifilm Kyowa Kirin
Biologics

* FDA-approved as of April 2021
8. Lessons
Adalimumab portends a difficult road ahead for
manufacturers seeking to create biosimilar-device combinations

226. Infra Table 3.
227. See Brennan, supra note 216.
228. Stanton Mehr, Further Dissecting the Launch of Adalimumab
Biosimilars in the US, BIOSIMILARS REV. & REP. (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://biosimilarsrr.com/2021/04/21/further-dissecting-the-launch-ofadalimumab-biosimilars-in-the-us/. An earlier release date for adalimumab
biosimilars in Europe (Oct. 2018) relates to a 2017 UK decision invalidating
Humira indication patents—that decision, however, is non-binding on other
jurisdictions like the United States. See Dan Stanton, UK High Court Rules
Against AbbVie in Humira Indication Patent Battle, BIOPHARMAREPORTER.COM (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Article
/2017/03/07/UK-High-Court-rules-against-AbbVie-in-Humira-indicationpatent-battle. This staggered market launch formed the basis for antitrust
litigation against AbbVie. See UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund v. AbbVie Inc.,
No. 20-2402 (7th Cir., filed July 30, 2020).
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for other top revenue-generating biologics: nearly five years
after its key patent expired, Humira faces no direct competition
in the United States. Biologics have emerged as essential
therapeutic options in the United States, with increasing
approvals and expanding utilization over the last several years,
but they have also become some of the most expensive therapies.
As compared to small-molecule generics, slower follow-on
entry and smaller cost savings from biosimilars have created
uncertainty as to whether robust biosimilar competition will
ever truly develop.229 Interchangeability designations may
emerge as a key requirement for biosimilars to successfully
compete with originator biologics. Though most states now allow
for interchangeable biosimilar substitution, state policies tend
to be more stringent for biologics than for small-molecule
drugs.230 On July 28, 2021, the FDA approved the first
interchangeable biosimilar, insulin glargine-yfgn [Semglee];
Boehringer Ingelheim’s Humira biosimilar Cyltezo received its
interchangeability designation three months later.231
Biosimilar interchangeability requirements, including
human factors studies, do not appear to require substantial
device similarity, though threshold analyses include physical
comparison of device constituent parts and design differences.232
In fact, the FDA notes that “comparative use human factors
studies . . . are intended to confirm that the differences in device
and labeling between the generic combination product and [the

229. See Mark R. Trusheim, Preston Atteberry, Jennifer A. Ohn & Peter B.
Bach, Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part 2): A Proposal For PostExclusivity Price Regulation Of Biologics, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.839549/full/ (arguing
that biologics are natural monopolies and are therefore more conducive to
setting prices through regulation rather than through market competition).
230. Chana A. Sacks et al., Assessment of Variation in State Regulation of
Generic Drug and Interchangeable Biologic Substitutions, 181 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 16 (2021).
231. FDA Approves First Interchangeable Biosimilar Insulin Product for
Treatment of Diabetes, FDA NEWS RELEASE (July 28, 2021), https://www.fda
.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-interchangeablebiosimilar-insulin-product-treatment-diabetes; see also Brennan, supra note
216.
232. Contents of a Complete Submissions for Threshold Analyses and
Human Health Factors Submissions to Drug and Biologic Applications, 83 Fed.
Reg. 49391 (proposed Oct. 1, 2018).
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reference product] are acceptable.”233 However, given the
likelihood of patentable features associated with the brandname device, listing of tertiary patents in the Purple Book may
create similar barriers to market entry for biosimilars as the
listing of tertiary patents in the Orange Book has for complex
generics.234 With extensive patent portfolios safeguarding new
biologic products, an efficient and cost-effective process for
challenging and invalidating improperly issued patents will be
essential to the development of a thriving biosimilar
marketplace.
C. CASE STUDY 3: NALOXONE [NARCAN AND EVZIO]
1. Injectable Naloxone
Naloxone is a potent opioid receptor antagonist used to
reverse respiratory arrest due to opioid-related overdose.235 It
was first approved in April 1971 as an intravenous,
intramuscular, or subcutaneous injection and was most
commonly used to treat opioid overdose in clinical settings.236
Generic injectables first entered the market in 1985, but they
were not designed for patient use.237 Studies have demonstrated
that generic intravenous medications are most susceptible to

233. Comparative Analyses and Related Comparative Use Human Factors
Studies for a Drug-Device Combination Product Submitted in an ANDA, 82
Fed. Reg. 4890 (proposed Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis].
234. As noted previously, there does appear to be some pushback against
listing tertiary patents in the Orange Book. See Beall & Kesselheim, supra note
79, at 143–44.
235. Harold Blumberg, Hyman B. Dayton & Peter S. Wolf, Counteraction of
Narcotic Antagonist Analgesics by the Narcotic Antagonist Naloxone, 123 PROC.
SOC’Y FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 755, 755 (1966).
236. U.S. Patent No. 3,493,657 (filed Jan. 23, 1964) (issued Feb. 3, 1970).
Interestingly, naloxone belongs to a group of pharmaceuticals that have no
other medicinal purpose than to reverse the adverse effects of other
pharmaceuticals. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY REVIEW FOR
REGULATORY ACTION: EVZIO (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2016/209862Orig1s000SumR.pdf.
Anticoagulation
reversal agents and glucagon are other examples. See Charles D. Peterson, J.
Steven Leeder & Steve Sterner, Glucagon Therapy for β-Blocker Overdose, 18
DRUG INTEL. & CLINICAL PHARMACY 394 (1984).
237. Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government Patent Use to Address
the Rising Cost of Naloxone: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio, 46 J.L. MED. ETHICS
472, 472 (2018) (citing Ravi Gupta, Nilay D. Shah & Joseph S. Ross, The Rising
Price of Naloxone – Risk to Efforts to Stem Overdose Deaths, 375 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2213 (2016)).
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shortage,238 and the early 2021 shortage of naloxone may have
been related to disrupted pharmaceutical supply chains during
COVID-19.239 The market for intravenous naloxone has been
relatively volatile since its approval, with several naloxone
products marketed and subsequently discontinued during that
time period, including Par Sterile Products’ version as recently
as January 2020.240
Given naloxone’s lifesaving properties, efforts were
undertaken to develop mechanisms for delivering the drug in
non-hospital settings.241 In response to an increasing need for
naloxone for consumer use, kaléo’s Evzio autoinjector was
approved in April 2014, an intramuscular injection that
delivered a single 0.4 mg dose of naloxone.242 The device is voiceguided and has detailed instructions printed on the product
itself.243 Two years later, kaléo received approval for a higher
dose form of Evzio, 2.0 mg per dose.244 By 2018, the 0.4 mg/dose
product was off the market, leaving only the higher dose. Citing
238. Tessema, Kesselheim & Sinha, supra note 31, at 1029–32.
239. Morgan Godvin, The US Faces a Naloxone Shortage at the Worst
Possible Time, FILTER (July 29, 2021), http://filtermag.org/us-naloxoneshortage. Interviewed here, Leo Beletsky speculates that Pfizer, a major
manufacturer of the drug, may have been stretched thin due to production
volume of COVID-19 vaccines. Id.
240. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 78, at 6-311, 6-312.
241. See generally John Stran et al., Take-Home Naloxone for the Emergency
Interim Management of Opioid Overdose: The Public Health Application of an
Emergency Medicine, 79 DRUGS 1395, 1395 (2019) (“Over two decades, the
concept of ‘take-home naloxone’ has evolved, comprising pre-provision of an
emergency supply to laypersons likely to witness an opioid overdose (e.g. peers
and family members of people who use opioids as well as nonmedical
personnel), with the recommendation to administer the naloxone to the
overdose victim as interim care while awaiting an ambulance.”).
242. See ORANGE BOOK, supra note 78; Carlyn Zwarenstein, The Price of
Saving a Life: Naloxone’s Cost Barrier in the US, FILTER (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://filtermag.org/naloxone-narcan-cost/.
243. EVZIO® (naloxone HCl injection, USP) Auto-Injector Now Available to
Patients in Select States Without a Prescription Through Kaléo’s New Virtual
Standing Order Pilot Program and to Government Agencies at a Direct
Purchase
Price,
CISION
PR
NEWSWIRE
(Apr.
5,
2018),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/evzio-naloxone-hcl-injection-uspauto-injector-now-available-to-patients-in-select-states-without-a-prescription
-through-kaleos-new-virtual-standing-order-pilot-program-and-to-government
-agencies-at-a-direct-purchase-price-300624974.html.
244. STAFF of S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 115TH CONG.,
COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS: THE PRICE INCREASE OF AN OPIOID OVERDOSE
REVERSAL DRUG AND THE COST TO THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2018)
[hereinafter COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS].
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“market dynamics and the entrance of alternative products,”
kaléo subsequently removed the 2.0 mg/dose Evzio product from
the market in September 2020.245
2. Naloxone Spray
At the time Evzio was approved, the intranasal route of
administration of naloxone constituted an unapproved use. One
such solution involved the combination of a prefilled syringe of
naloxone with a mucosal atomization device for intranasal
spraying.246 Clinical trials confirmed the efficacy of the
intranasal route of administration,247 and the off-label use of
intranasal naloxone by nasal atomizer grew in popularity as
many programs and communities searched for new solutions to
address the overdose crisis.248 However, amid concerns related
to the atomizer device, including inconsistent delivery of
adequate dose, the manufacturer, Teleflex, voluntarily recalled
the product.249
The unexpected recall prompted an urgent need for an
alternative mechanism to intranasally deliver naloxone. An
intranasal naloxone product [Narcan] was subsequently
developed by Adapt Pharma, Inc. and approved by the FDA on
November 18, 2015.250 The new Narcan device was developed by

245. Zwarenstein, supra note 242.
246. See Erik D. Barton et al., Efficacy of Intranasal Naloxone as a
Needleless Alternative for Treatment of Opioid Overdose in the Prehospital
Setting, 29 J. EMERGENCY MED. 265 (2005); Maya Doe-Simkins et al.,
Alexander Y. Walley, Andy Epstein & Peter Moyer, Saved by the Nose:
Bystander-Administered Intranasal Naloxone Hydrochloride for Opioid
Overdose, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 788 (2009).
247. See Anne-Maree Kelly et al., Randomised Trial of Intranasal Versus
Intramuscular Naloxone in Prehospital Treatment for Suspected Opioid
Overdose, 182 MED. J. AUSTL. 24 (2005); Debra Kerr et al., Randomized
Controlled Trial Comparing the Effectiveness and Safety of Intranasal and
Intramuscular Naloxone for the Treatment of Suspected Heroin Overdose, 104
ADDICTION 2067 (2009).
248. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY REVIEW FOR REGULATORY
ACTION: NARCAN NASAL SPRAY (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfda_docs/summary_review/2017/208411s001SumR.pdf.
249. David Anderson, Manufacturer of Naloxone Atomizers Issues National
Recall, Horford Residents Should Check if Their Devices are Affected, BALT.
SUN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/harford/aegis
/ph-ag-narcan-recall-1216-20161215-story.html.
250. FDA Moves Quickly to Approve Easy-to-Use Nasal Spray to Treat
Opioid Overdose, AHDB (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.ahdbonline.com/in-the-
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a researcher who had previously received $3.45 million in
federal funding from the National Institute on Drug Abuse from
2010 to 2014 to develop such a product.251
3. Tertiary Patents
Given that the patent covering the small-molecule
compound of naloxone has expired, any Orange Book-listed
patents for Evzio or Narcan are likely to be tertiary patents
covering their delivery devices. Indeed, in 2016, the sole patent
covering intranasal naloxone was for “[a]single-use, pre-primed
device adapted for nasal delivery of a pharmaceutical
composition to a patient by one actuation of said device into one
nostril of said patient.”252 Interestingly, this patent claims the
device but lacks drawings or figures of the device itself.253 There
are currently eight patents for Narcan listed in the 2021 Orange
Book, all with a common expiration date of March 16, 2035.254
None of these patents contain drawings or figures of the device.
By contrast, the Evzio device had fifteen listed patents in
the 2015 Orange Book, the latest expiring in 2032.255 All fifteen
are device patents with titles such as “Devices, systems and
methods for medicament delivery;” “Medicament delivery device
configured to produce an audible output;” “Medical injector with
compliance tracking and monitoring;” “Medicament delivery
device having an electronic circuit system;” and “Medicament
delivery device for administration of opioid antagonists
including formulations for naloxone.”256 The latest-issued
patent on the list has fifty associated figures.257 In spite of its
market departure, the complexity of the patent portfolio

news-december-2015/2027-fda-moves-quickly-to-approve-easy-to-use-nasalspray-to-treat-opioid-overdose.
251. See Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 237, at 475; see also Intranasal
Naloxone: An Opioid Overdose Antidote, NIH REPORTER (Mar. 30, 2011),
https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/8211426.
252. Nasal Drug Products and Their Methods of Use, U.S. Patent No.
9,211,253 (filed Mar. 16, 2015) (issued Dec. 15, 2015).
253. Id.
254. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 78, at ADA 206.
255. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (35th ed. 2015).
256. Id.
257. Medicament Delivery Device for Admin. of Opioid Antagonists
Including Formulations of Naloxone, U.S. Patent No. 8,627,816 (filed Feb. 28,
2011) (issued Jan. 14, 2014).
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covering the Evzio device will almost certainly deter competitors
seeking to produce complex generics. The 2021 Orange Book
lists both Evzio products (0.4 mg/ml and 2.0 mg/ml), now with
thirty-one patents covering both products, though the product is
listed as discontinued in the updated Drugs@FDA website.258
Given that the product has been discontinued, a generic
manufacturer has no clear path to replicate the device unless it
pursues licensing agreements with kaléo.
The first generic intranasal naloxone spray was approved
in April 2019.259 Three months later, in response to a worsening
opioid crisis, the FDA announced that it would be prioritizing
the review of ANDAs for Narcan and Evzio products to increase
access to these essential medications.260
4. Market for Naloxone
A 2016 study of naloxone prescriptions found a split market
between branded Narcan nasal spray (36.7%), branded Evzio
auto-injector (33.8%), and generic formulations (29.5%).261 In a
second study, Evzio was the second most widely-dispensed
naloxone product, accounting for 20% of naloxone prescriptions
in the United States during the second quarter of 2017.262
Clinical practice guidelines recommend that naloxone be co-

258. The first Evzio device was approved via 505(b)(2). U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., NDA No. 205787 (approved Apr.
3, 2014), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/205787Ori
g1s000Approv.pdf. The second Evzio device was also approved via 505(b)(2).
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., NDA No.
209862
(approved
Oct.
19,
2016),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2016/209862Orig1s000ltr.pdf.
259. FDA Approves First Generic Naloxone Nasal Spray to Treat Opioid
Overdose, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-generic-naloxone-nasalspray-treat-opioid-overdose.
260. Zachary Brennan, FDA to Speed Review of Generic Versions of Opioid
Overdose Antidote, REG. FOCUS (July 8, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-andarticles/news-articles/2019/7/fda-to-speed-review-of-generic-versions-of-opioid.
261. Rosanna Smart, Caroline K. Geiger, Christopher M. Jones & Bradley
D. Stein, An Observational Study of Retail Pharmacy Naloxone Prescriptions:
Differences Across Provider Specialties and Patient Populations, 35 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1768, 1769 (2020).
262. Patricia R. Freeman, Emily R. Hankosky, Michelle R. Lofwall & Jeffery
C. Talbert, The Changing Landscape of Naloxone Availability in the United
States, 2011–2017, 191 DRUG ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 361,362 (2018).
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prescribed to high-risk patients taking prescription opioids, but
the practice is relatively uncommon.263
In 2019, total spending (before rebates) on Narcan in
Medicaid was $45 million; in Medicare Part D, it was $51.3
million.264 Medicare Part D spending on nearly 2000 units of
Evzio was $9.9 million, corresponding to average spending
(before rebates) of over $5,000 per unit; Evzio is not listed in the
Medicaid dashboard for 2019, indicating that fewer than fifty
units were dispensed nationwide.265
5. Pricing for Naloxone
When launched, 0.4 mg/ml Evzio had an AWP of $862.50
per unit.266 By 2015, that price had increased to $1125, followed
by a 400% increase to $5625 per unit, prompting outcry from
activists and policymakers alike.267 In contrast, the intranasal
formulation, Narcan, has been priced at $75 per unit since its
launch 2015.268 Despite multiple acquisitions and the known
link between pharmaceutical product acquisitions and price
increases, Narcan’s price has yet to be increased.269
Despite the relatively high cost of a single dose of Narcan,
several states have moved toward standing orders for naloxone
at pharmacies.270 Policymakers have also advocated for
263. Rachel E. Barenie et al., Rates and Costs of Dispensing Naloxone to
Patients at High Risk for Opioid Overdose in the United States, 2014–2018, 43
DRUG SAFETY 669, 669 (2020).
264. See Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note
161; see Medicaid Drug Spending Dashboard, supra note 161.
265. See Medicare Part D Drug Spending Dashboard & Data, supra note
161.
266. REDBOOK, supra note 169 (search by product name and enter “Evzio”
in the search bar).
267. REDBOOK, supra note 169 (search by product name and enter “Evzio”
in the search bar); see also COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 244.
268. COMBATTING THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 244 (“The WAC for Narcan
was $125 with a $75 bulk pricing for government entities.”).
269. Tessema, Kesselheim & Sinha, supra note 31, at 1026–27. Emergent
Biosolutions acquired Adapt Pharma in August 2018 but did not raise the price
of Narcan. See Meredith Cohn, Maryland Pharmaceutical Company Buys
Maker of Overdose Reversal Drug Narcan for $735 Million, BALT. SUN (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-emergent-buys-narcanmaker-20180829-story.html.
270. See, e.g., Kirk E. Evoy et al., Naloxone Availability Without a Prescriber
Encounter Under Standing Orders at Community Pharmacy Chains in Texas,
320 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1934, 1934–36 (2018) (describing naloxone standing
orders in different states).
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intranasal naloxone to be reclassified from prescription-only to
over-the counter; though it is not clear what effect this will have
on price, access would likely improve.271
6. Higher Doses
As noted above, a higher-dose Evzio product was approved
via the 505(b)(2) pathway in 2016 but discontinued by 2020. A
new high-dose intranasal formulation (Kloxxado, 8mg/dose)
from Hikma Pharmaceuticals was approved via the 505(b)(2)
pathway in April 2021.272 Some have argued that synthetic
opioids require higher doses of naloxone to reverse,273 yet others
are skeptical about the need for a higher dose.274 With pricing
set at the same level as Narcan, Kloxxado is unlikely to
significantly increase access to naloxone in the short-term.275
7. Lessons
Increased access to naloxone is urgently needed to respond
to the overdose crisis, which claimed the lives of over 100,000
people in the United States in the twelve-month period ending
April 2021.276 Others have pushed for lowering the cost of

271. Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Over the Counter Naloxone Needed to
Save Lives in the United States, 130 PREVENTIVE MED. 105932 (2020) (“In this
Commentary, we argue that FDA can and should immediately reclassify
naloxone from prescription-only to over-the-counter status, a change that could
save hundreds if not thousands of lives in the United States every year.”).
272. FDA Approves Higher Dosage of Naloxone Nasal Spray to Treat Opioid
Overdose, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-higher-dosage-naloxonenasal-spray-treat-opioid-overdose.
273. See, e.g., Ronald B. Moss & Dennis J. Carlo, Higher Doses of Naloxone
Are Needed in the Synthetic Opioid Era, 14 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT,
PREVENTION, & POL’Y 6 (2019) (“[W]e propose that higher doses of naloxone are
needed to combat the new era of overdoses due to the more potent synthetic
opioids such as fentanyl.”).
274. See, e.g., Lucas G. Hill, Claire M. Zagorski & Lindsey J. Loera,
Increasingly Powerful Opioid Antagonists Are Not Necessary, 99 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 103457, 103457 (2022) (“The proliferation of powerful opioid antagonists
could have unintended consequences that are counterproductive to efforts to
prevent opioid-related overdose deaths. Precipitated opioid withdrawal is a
known risk of naloxone for opioid-tolerant individuals, producing symptoms
such as hyperalgesia, diarrhea, and vomiting, particularly at higher doses.”).
275. REDBOOK, supra note 169 (search results by product name and enter
“Kloxxado” and “Narcan” in the search bar).
276. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention: National Center for Health
Statistics, Drug Overdose Deaths in the U.S. Top 100,000 Annually, CDC (Nov.
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Narcan through march-in rights, especially given the
substantial contribution of federal funding to its
development.277 Prior to Evzio’s withdrawal from the market,
some called for the federal government to step in and use kaléo’s
patents for Evzio under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.278 This might be more
feasible now that Evzio is off the market, though intranasal
forms have become the preferred method of community naloxone
use. The better scenario may be an influx of complex generic
competitors to intranasal Narcan, which will substantially
lower prices over time. To accomplish this, the FDA must
continue to incentivize ANDA applications for Narcan,279 and
nonprofit manufacturers should be incentivized to produce
intranasal naloxone at cost.280
Other policy proposals, though they do not relate to
combination products, should be noted here. Similar to COVID19 vaccines, the federal government could make wholesale
purchases of naloxone and distribute them to states based on

17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2021/2021
1117.htm.
277. Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 237, at 475; 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2021); see
also Carolyn L. Treasure, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Do March-In
Rights Ensure Access to Medical Products Arising from Federally Funded
Research? A Qualitative Study, 93 MILBANK Q. 761, 762 (2015) (“We found that
the existence of march-in rights may select for government research licensees
more likely to commercialize the results and that they can be used to extract
minor concessions from licensees. But as currently specified in the statute, such
march-in rights are unlikely to serve as a counterweight to lower the prices of
medical products arising from federally funded research.”).
278. See, e.g., Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 237, at 475–77 (“We
encourage the government to take corrective action by threatening to use 28
U.S.C. § 1498 to infringe on Kaléo’s patents by importing generics or
contracting with another pharmaceutical to produce Evzio. Doing so could
pressure Kaléo to produce the drug in exchange for a reasonable royalty.”);
Gupta, Shah & Ross, supra note 237, at 2215 (“[The] governments could invoke
federal law 28 U.S.C. section 1498 to contract with a manufacturer to act on
behalf of the United States and produce less costly versions of Evzio’s patented
auto-injector in exchange for reasonable royalties — an approach that was
considered for procuring ciprofloxacin during the anthrax threat in 2001.”).
279. Brennan, supra note 260.
280. One such nonprofit, Civica Rx, already manufactures injectable
naloxone in conjunction with Hikma Pharmaceuticals. Civica Rx and Hikma
Announce Shipments of Heparin and Seven Other Essential Injectable
Medicines, CIVICA RX (Dec. 12, 2019), https://civicarx.org/civica-rx-and-hikmaannounce-shipments-of-heparin-and-seven-other-essential-injectablemedicines/.
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need.281 The federal government could establish a program, akin
to the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program,282 that funds grants to
states, cities, and community-based organizations to provide
care and treatment, including procurement and dispensing of
naloxone. Had it passed, the Comprehensive Addiction
Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of 2019 would have provided
over $100 billion in federal funding to state and local
governments over a ten-year period; the bill—now seeking $125
billion in federal funding over ten years—was reintroduced with
substantial Democratic support on December 16, 2021.283
Policymakers must also focus on upstream nonpharmaceutical
interventions that reduce the number of overdoses, such as
fentanyl testing strips, supervised consumption sites, and
syringe exchange services.284
VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The challenges facing competition in the combination
product sector are substantial. With lessons from these three
case studies in mind, I offer solutions across the life cycle of
combination products that, if executed in part or in full, may
improve market competition and lower prices.
A. STRENGTHEN INITIAL FDA REVIEW
When combination products are approved, a more thorough
and streamlined review process is needed. CDER and CBER
arguably do not have the expertise to adequately evaluate drug
281. See Gupta, Shah & Ross, supra note 237, at 2215 (“[N]aloxone could be
purchased in bulk, which would create stable demand that might motivate
additional companies to begin manufacturing the medication — a strategy
that’s been used for vaccine manufacturing.”).
282. About the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program, HRSA, https://hab
.hrsa.gov/about-ryan-white-hivaids-program/about-ryan-white-hivaidsprogram (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
283. The Comprehensive Addiction Resources Emergency (CARE) Act of
2019, H.R. 2569, 116th Cong. (2019); Maloney, Warren, and Baldwin Lead More
than 100 Democrats in Senate and House in Reintroducing Landmark CARE
Act to Combat the Substance Use Epidemic, U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND REFORM (Dec. 16, 2021), https://oversight.house.gov
/news/press-releases/maloney-warren-and-baldwin-lead-more-than-100democrats-in-senate-and-house-in.
284. See Alyssa M. Peckham & Erika H. Young, Opportunities to Offer
Harm Reduction to People Who Inject Drugs During Infectious Disease
Encounters: Narrative Review, OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 2020 (describing
opportunities to reduce harm caused by injecting drugs).
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delivery devices, so CDRH and the Office of Combined Products
should remain integrally involved in multi-center review of such
products. Jointly prepared guidance documents—such as the
“Comparative Analyses and Related Comparative Use Human
Factors Studies for a Drug-Device Combination Product
Submitted in an ANDA” from January 2017—are a good start.285
Pooled expertise for product review is also likely to improve the
safety of combination products entering the market, which
would mitigate safety-related recalls and mandated device
improvements. Postmarket combination product surveillance is
also important and will require ongoing input from CDRH
officials as well.
In order to disincentivize tertiary patenting and marketing
of devices based on unique features, device components for
certain classes of combination products could be made more
uniform. A standardized respiratory inhaler, for instance, could
contribute to increased adherence and improved patient
outcomes, not to mention lower costs from more robust
competition. Insulin pens are another class of medication
delivery devices ripe for standardization. Though this could
have a long-term impact on innovation of such devices, that risk
may be outweighed by the benefit of substantially lower drug
costs in the near-term.
B. PATENT REFORMS TO FACILITATE MARKET ENTRY OF
COMPETITORS
Patent reform is also needed. Some have debated whether
pharmaceutical patent terms should be shortened.286 Others
argue that the patent dance is unnecessarily onerous.287 With
products like Humira, even the patent dance cannot invalidate
enough patents at once, and certainly not when the
manufacturer settles every case, leaving those patents in force.
IPR proceedings may invalidate some patents, but the USPTO

285. Comparative Analysis, supra note 233, at 1.
286. See, e.g., Lawrence J. McQuillan, How a Reformed FDA Can Speed Up
Delivery of Lifesaving Drugs, THE HILL (May 20, 2021), https://thehill
.com/opinion/healthcare/554580-how-a-reformed-fda-can-speed-up-delivery-oflifesaving-drugs (exploring the potential benefits of shortening pharmaceutical
patent terms).
287. See Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, 2018 U. ILL.
L. REV. ONLINE 113 (2018) (commenting on Michael A. Carrier & Carl J.
Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 ILL. L. REV. 1 (2018)).
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is similarly limited in the number of patents it can review at a
time; its decisions are also subject to judicial review. Finally, the
traditional process of patent litigation for small-molecule drugs,
and the thirty-month stay it automatically triggers, may provide
outsized rewards to brand-name manufacturers for maintaining
large patent portfolios.
In fact, patent quantity, not patent quality, appears to have
become the key determinant of successful patent litigation.
Manufacturers should be discouraged from engaging in product
hopping, particularly when the intent is to transfer market
share to other branded products before market exclusivity
ends.288 GSK (Advair) and AbbVie (Humira) have each been
successful in this regard.289 There may be progress on this front
soon: at President Biden’s direction, the FDA sent a letter to the
USPTO, “seeking to facilitate greater awareness of our
complementary work and introduce efficiency in our respective
workstreams.”290 The letter also acknowledges the potential
misuse of the patent system to “unduly extend market
monopolies and keep drug prices high without any meaningful
benefits for patients.”291
C. COMPLEX GENERIC ANDA OR 505(B)(2)? WHY NOT A NEW
APPROACH?
Though imperfect, the small-molecule ANDA pathway
created under the Hatch-Waxman Act has been one of the great
successes in pharmaceutical policy, substantially lowering drug

288. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change:
Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV.
1129, 1130 (2019) (“This ‘product hopping’ strategy runs counter to the goal of
the legislative framework for regulating branded and generic drug approvals,
which is to create appropriate incentives for discoveries that elevate the quality
of patient care and human health by providing a period of reward for the brand
followed by timely and effectual generic entry.”).
289. The European system, which provides only a single period of regulatory
exclusivity per new molecular entity, may curtail this strategy substantially.
See Michael S. Sinha, Sven J.R. Bostyn & Timo Minssen, Addressing
Exclusivity Issues During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond, in COVID-19
AND THE LAW: DISRUPTION, IMPACT AND LEGACY (I. Glenn Cohen, Abbe Gluck,
Katherine Kraschel & Carmel Shachar eds.) (forthcoming 2022), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3889894.
290. Letter from Janet Woodcock to Andrew Hirshfeld, Acting Dir. of the
U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media
/152086/download.
291. Id. at 4–5.
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prices while fostering the widespread use of safe and effective
generic drugs. However, superimposing the complex generic
pathway onto the ANDA—with requirements of bioequivalence,
label equivalence, and substantial device similarity—has
hindered progress in this sector while dissuading would-be
competitors looking to market generic combination products.
The FDA guidance notes that ANDA applicants should
“seek to minimize differences from the user interface,” though
the agency can “accept such design differences if they are
adequately analyzed, scientifically justified, and do not preclude
approval in an ANDA.”292 It is also not clear why the FDA insists
that “end-users of generic combination products [must be able
to] use the generic combination product when it is substituted
for the [reference product] without the intervention of the health
care provider and/or without additional training prior to use.”293
Device re-training can easily be accomplished by health care
workers or pharmacists; such re-training could also be required
as part of a risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS)
program for generic dispensing at the pharmacy level rather
than being used as an impediment to complex generic
approval.294
The device component of generic combination products need
not meet the same rigorous equivalence obligations of smallmolecule ANDAs to be safe and effective for widespread use.
There are aspects of trade dress—such as the size, shape, and
color of the Advair Diskus—that need not be replicated for
appropriate medical use of a complex generic.295 Yet the
505(b)(2) process is no panacea either. As an NDA submission,
it is more costly for the company to file and more timeconsuming for the FDA to review. Moreover, in most cases,
505(b)(2) combination products have failed to gain traction in
the market. Retroactively awarding AB Orange Book
designations to these products, like the FDA did with Perrigo’s
292. Comparative Analysis, supra note 233, at 1–5 (emphasis added). The
agency seems to be implying here that even small deviations from the reference
device would preclude approval in an ANDA.
293. Comparative Analysis, supra note 233, at 3.
294. REMS have also been invoked to forestall generic competition, though
more commonly through refusing to develop a shared REMS, restricting
distribution of products or patenting REMS. See Vökinger, Kesselheim, Avorn
& Sarpatwari, supra note 8, at 1666–67.
295. See, e.g., Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 159 (exploring the
consequences of variations in the appearance of pills).
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AndroGel generic,296 may go a long way toward solving the
problem of market penetration, but it fails to address the
bureaucratic inefficiency of pursuing approval through the
505(b)(2) pathway.
A new intermediate approval process might be the
appropriate solution: it could take the form of a hybrid
ANDA/510k approval process.297 Congress can establish such a
process through legislation, making user fees reasonable,
requiring CDRH involvement in all approval decisions, and
streamlining the process for human factors studies through the
development of a more flexible standard of “functional
equivalence” for medical device components of combination
products. Unlike substantial equivalence, a standard of
“functional equivalence” will allow for the development of
complex generics with different devices, so long as they perform
the same central functions without compromising safety or
efficacy. Finally, the FDA should develop a priority list of
existing 505(b)(2)-approved products with non-interchangeable
designations, encouraging those manufacturers to petition for
AB interchangeability.
Manufacturers should also be discouraged from
combination product hops, either by substituting a new device
(e.g., Advair HFA) or by adjusting formulations or doses of
pharmaceuticals within combination products (e.g., Evzio 0.4mg
to Evzio 2.0mg). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should
more closely scrutinize such products for anticompetitive
motivations. For instance, given its modest (not to mention
unproven) additional clinical value, Humira Citrate-free should
not have pre-emptively depleted the potential market share for
adalimumab biosimilars so substantially prior to their
anticipated market entry in 2023. In addition, altering
concentrations or dosing intervals should not generate new
market exclusivities for combination products, thereby blocking
competitors.298 Citizen Petitions, which are often filed with
296. See PHARM. DEV. GRP., supra note 117.
297. The FDA’s 510(k) premarket notification pathway for medical devices
allows for the marketing of safe and effective devices that demonstrate
substantial equivalence to a legally marketed device. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2021);
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,, SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE BASED
PATHWAY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 1
(2019).
298. Hagen, supra note 210; see also Benjamin N. Rome, Frazer A. Tessema
& Aaron S. Kesselheim, U.S. Spending Associated with Transition from Daily
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anticompetitive motivations, should also be disregarded by the
FDA when such documents focus on subtle differences in device
form or function.
D. CURBING INCENTIVES FOR TERTIARY PATENTING
Once marketed, tertiary patents should not be allowed to
extend market exclusivity so substantially. As noted above,
delisting from the FDA’s Orange and Purple Books will help. In
a recent public comment to the FDA, I made the
recommendation to delist most secondary patents and all
tertiary patents from the Orange Book.299 Transparency is
important, but when tertiary patents are listed in these
compendia, onerous standards like Paragraph IV certifications
prior to launch result in drawn-out processes for patent
litigation. That said, delisting tertiary patents alone will not
protect competitors from patent litigation.
Perhaps the best way around this is to allow complex
generics to develop products using alternative delivery devices.
The lesson from Mylan’s Wixela Inhub and Teva’s epinephrine
autoinjector should be that requiring substantial similarity to
the brand-name device is no simple task. Moreover, the patient
safety or adherence benefits of substantially equivalent devices
can be overcome through patient education. Patients can be
taught to use new medical devices containing the same
medications as their costlier brand-name equivalents, and
human factors studies—both pre- and postmarket—can be used
to evaluate whether patients can safely and effectively
transition between brand-name and complex generic products.
to 3-Times-Weekly Glatiramer Acetate, 180 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED.
1165 (2020) (concluding that “[e]xtended market exclusivity from introducing a
new version of an existing brand-name drug can yield manufacturer returns
out of proportion to the level of investment or risk involved; more limited
incentives could encourage incremental innovations to existing drugs at a lower
societal cost”). In this case, it appears to be the formulation, and not the device
patents, standing in the way of generic competition for Copaxone. Copaxone
does not have a “pen” equivalent, though glatiramer acetate is dispensed in
glass syringes, which can be administered using the company’s proprietary
autoinjector. See Here with Your Dosing Options for Your Lifestyle, COPAXONE,
https://www.copaxone.com/about-copaxone/dosage-information (last visited
Jan. 13, 2022).
299. Michael S. Sinha & Reed F. Beall, Listing of Patent Information in the
Orange Book; Establishment of a Public Docket; Request for Comments;
Reopening of Comment Period, REGULATIONS.GOV (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FDA-2020-N-1127-0028.
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Brand-name manufacturers should also be disincentivized
from making any patent-protected manufacturing changes to
brand-name drug-device and biologic-device combinations when
such changes do not meaningfully add clinical benefit. This may
have factored into AbbVie’s decision to switch Humira from prefilled syringes to single-use pens.300
E. FIXING BIOSIMILARS AND BIOLOGIC DRUG-DEVICES
Biosimilar-device
products—and
more
generally,
biosimilars—need a quicker path to market, which requires
greater clarity from the FDA regarding the studies needed to
demonstrate interchangeability. This may require statutory
change, as the BPCIA requires that interchangeable biosimilars
“be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference
product in any given patient.”301 Given the complexity of
biologics and the role of trade secrets in limiting exact
replication,302 some leniency may be justifiable. Principles of
noninferiority, often discussed in the context of antibiotics, may
be particularly applicable when comparing biologics to
biosimilars.303 Once biologics obtain interchangeability
designations, state biosimilar product selection laws should be
amended to facilitate switching; though most states already
require the interchangeability designation as a condition of
switching from biologics to biosimilars, many still require
physician consent before a switch can be made.
More work should be done to address misconceptions and
skepticism of biosimilars.304 Physicians continue to express
reluctance toward switching patients from biologics to
biosimilars regardless of clinical equivalence and cost

300. See HUMIRA, supra Figure 4. Of note, the FDA does have guidance for
manufacturers seeking to transition to new delivery devices. See U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., BRIDGING FOR DRUG-DEVICE AND BIOLOGIC-DEVICE
COMBINATION PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1 (2019).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4) (2021).
302. See generally Price & Rai, supra note 191 (exploring the consequences
of trade secrecy on biosimilar development).
303. See Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Regulatory Incentives for
Antibiotic Drug Development: A Review of Recent Proposals, 24 BIOORGANIC &
MEDICINAL CHEM. 6446, 6447 (2016).
304. See Cynthia M. Ho, Biosimilar Bias: A Barrier to Addressing American
Drug Costs, 99 DENVER L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3908625.

360

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

savings.305 And fewer than half of physicians in a 2016 survey
noted they would be comfortable prescribing biosimilars when
they become available; about 40% indicated they would need
more education on biosimilars prior to prescribing.306
Alternative delivery devices may add to this skepticism, but
biosimilar REMS programs that require patient training prior
to dispensing may alleviate those concerns.
Finally, the biologic-biosimilar settlement problem must be
solved. As in the case of AbbVie and Humira,307 when such
settlements are nothing more than market-sharing agreements
in disguise, they may run afoul of antitrust laws. Increased FTC
scrutiny of settlement agreements should curb some of the more
egregious practices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The advent of increasingly complex combination products
has significantly changed the paradigm for how generic
competitors can and should enter the market once exclusivity
ends. The FDA continues to face challenges with its approach to
complex generics, such that ANDA applicants receive multiple
CRLs and many manufacturers opt to pursue the 505(b)(2)
pathway as a clearer path to market entry. A new, intermediate
pathway for complex generics would acknowledge that the
ANDA pathway is ill-suited for such products, yet the NDA is
costly, inefficient, and does not lead to robust market
competition. An intercenter review process, involving FDA
officials in CDER, CBER, CDRH, and the Office of Combination
Products, may be needed to remedy both the initial approval
process for innovators and the subsequent approval process for
complex generics and biosimilar-device products.
Ultimately, progress toward meaningful price competition
among combination products will need to come through
305. See Richard G. Frank, Friction in the Path to Use of Biosimilar Drugs,
378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 791, 791 (2018) (“[M]ultiple surveys of physicians reveal
that even those who routinely use biologic products do not have a clear
understanding of biosimilar products. Physicians are therefore naturally
hesitant to prescribe biosimilars — especially given that regulations create the
impression that a biosimilar may not be all that similar to its originator.”
(citation omitted)).
306. Larry Dobrow, What Do Physicians Think About Biosimilars?, MED.
MKTG. & MEDIA (May 25, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.mmm-online.com/comm
ercial/what-do-physicians-think-about-biosimilars/article/498542/.
307. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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interchangeability and automatic substitution at the level of
dispensing. Just as brand-brand competition in the smallmolecule drug space has not led to significant cost reductions,
505(b)(2)-approved brand-name “generics” are unlikely to
significantly lower the cost of flagship drug-device combinations
or meaningfully cut into their market share and revenue
streams. The extent to which price competition develops in this
sector will depend on the FDA’s ability to resolve regulatory
uncertainty around the complex generic approval process.

***

